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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was the Trial Court correct when it ordered Summit

County to effectuate the removal of the Utelite facility where
undisputed and admitted material facts proved as a matter of law
that Summit County's decision to allow Utelite to place and
operate a loading facility in a rural residential zone violated
the Summit County Development Code and Utah statutes?
Standard of Review: Issue of law--correctness.

Berenda v.

Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996); Kilpatrick v. Wiley,
Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996).
Preservation of issue:

See Appellants' Preservation of

Issue No. 1, Appellants' Brief at 1.
2.

Was the Trial Court's Order to remove the facility

allowed under the Summit County Development Code and Utah law?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue:

Same as Issue

No. 1 above.
3.

Was the Trial Court correct in determining that Summit

County violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act when the
undisputed facts established that there was no notice for the
Planning Commission Meeting at which approval was given to
Utelite to move to Echo?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue:
1 above.
1

Same as issue

4.

Was the Trial Court correct in determining that Summit

County violated plaintiffs' due process rights when there was no
notice for the Planning Commission Meeting at which approval was
given to Utelite to move to Echo?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue:

Same as issue

1 above.
5.

Was the trial court correct when it denied plaintiffs'

request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988?
Standard of review:

A trial court's conclusions of law are

reviewed on appeal for correctness.

Sanders v. Sharp, 886

P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991).
Preservation of Issue:

See Order re:

Award of Plaintiffs'

Attorney's Fees, (R. 2322).
6.

Was the Union Pacific Railroad a necessary and

indispensable party to this action when it was not required to be
a party for the Court to enforce the Summit County Development
Code and Utah zoning law.
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue:

See

Appellants' Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue No.
6, Appellants' Brief at 2.
7.

Did the trial court correctly determine that a claim of

nuisance per se can be based on a prohibited use under zoning
laws?
Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue:

See

Appellants' Standard of Review and Preservation of Issue No.
2

6, Appellants7 Brief at 2.
8.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

prohibiting discovery against Summit County although there were
claims remaining against it, Summit County was participating in
discovery, and was still a party after the Court entered its
order for partial summary judgment?
Standard of review:

A trial court's decision to limit

discovery is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 669 F.2d 620,
623 (10th Cir. 1982) (construing Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
Preservation of Issue:

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition

to Summit County's Motion for Protective Order (R. 725);
Protective Order (R. 775).
9.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying

the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint
when a trial date had not been set and the amendment sought to
conform to evidence fully discovered and sought to clarify claims
already made?
Standard of review:

The trial court's determination of a

motion for leave to file an amended complaint is reviewed on
appeal for abuse of discretion.

Westlev v. Farmers Ins.

Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983).
Preservation of Issue:

Plaintiffs' Motion to File Third

Amended Complaint and Supporting Memorandum (R. 779);
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (R. 911, 918), and
3

Order Denying Motion to Amend and Motion for
Reconsideration. (R. 1024).
10.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error when

it granted motions in limine precluding the plaintiffs from
introducing evidence that the Utelite facility was built directly
upon a public road and affected access of the plaintiff Richins
and the Dicker Hill Trust?
Standard of review:

A trial court's decision to admit or

preclude evidence is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion.

State v. Rena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) .

Preservation of Issue:

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition

to Utelite's Motion in Limine, (R. 1488); Order re:

Motions

in Limine and Discovery Motion (R. 1762).
11.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error in

permitting the jury to view the Utelite site purportedly on the
basis that the plaintiffs were seeking present and future damages
when it limited the damages to those incurred only to the date of
trial and when such a view was prejudicial and did not
demonstrate the normal operation of the Utelite facility?
Standard of review:

A trial court's decision to allow a

jury to view a specific site is reviewed on appeal for abuse
of discretion.

State v. Carbututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah

1993) .
Preservation of Issue:

Plaintiffs' Opposition to Utelite's

Motion for Jury View (R. 1460); Objection at Trial (R.
2663) .
4

12.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

adopting clearly erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of
law that purport to establish the Utelite facility as presently
operating is not a nuisance.
Standard of review:

The trial court's conclusions of law

are reviewed on appeal for correctness.
886 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991).

Saunders v. Sharp,

A trial court's findings

of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.
Alta Indust. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993).
Preservation of Issue:

Plaintiffs' Objection to Utelite'

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law re:
Equitable Relief (R. 2198).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix 3

Development Code of
Summit County
Utah Code Ann. §§ 1727-6.5, et seq.
(1987)
Utah Open and Public
Meetings Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1,
et sea. (1989) .

Appendix 14
Appendix 15

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/appellees ("plaintiffs") brought this case to
remove Utelite's loading facility which was illegally placed near
their homes and businesses. (R. 7-8).
were named as defendants because:

Summit County and Utelite

(1) the Summit County Planning

Commission decided in a planning commission meeting, without any
5

notice to the plaintiffs or the public, that the loading facility
could locate in Echo as a "permitted" use in a neighborhood zoned
rural residential (R. 2) ; and, (2) Utelite applied for and Summit
County issued a building permit for the facility more than six
months after it was built and was operating without having a
certificate of zoning compliance. (R. 3)
Because these actions directly violated the law, the
plaintiffs primarily sought and continue to seek the remedy of
removal of the facility under the Summit County Development Code
("Development Code") and Utah statutes. (R. 282-83; 313).
Secondarily, the plaintiffs sought and continue to seek damages
for the harm suffered as a result of the illegal placement of the
facility. (R. 312, 317-318)
In this appeal, the plaintiffs request the affirmance of the
Trial Court's determination that Summit County effectuate the
removal of the facility in accordance with the Development Code
and Utah zoning law.

Should the Court order a new trial,

plaintiffs also request the Court permit them to seek damages and
further equitable relief.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This action was originally commenced on July 31, 1990,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the acts and
omissions of Summit County ("County") allowing the Utelite
Corporation ("Utelite") to build a new loading facility and to
operate next to the plaintiffs homes, businesses and farms
violated the Development Code §§ 1.9, 1.15, 1.16, 12.7, 12.20;
6

Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-7, 18 and 23; Utah's Open and Public
Meetings Act, §§ 52-4-1, et seq.; and due process guarantees,
Utah Const, art. I, § 7, U.S. Const., amend. XIV. (R. 1-14).

The

plaintiffs sought to have the decision by Defendant Summit County
locating the facility to be declared null and void, sought to
have the facility removed and sought an award of costs and
attorney's fees.

(R. 7-8).

Plaintiffs' Complaint was amended to name the Utelite
Corporation as a Defendant on November 2, 1990.

(R. 78-79).

Utelite filed a lengthy Answer and responded to written
discovery.

(R. 95; A. 1 ) . The following material facts were

established by the pleadings and official documents of the
County:
(1) Utelite received verbal permission from the
Planning Commission in a Planning Commission meeting to
move its facility to Echo (A. 1 at No. 14);
(2) Utelite received a letter from the Chairman of the
Planning Commission to confirm the discussion at the
Planning Commission Meeting that it was the consensus of
the Commission that the Utelite operation "presently"
set-up in Wanship, Utah could move to Echo and would be
considered a "permitted" use (R. 9, 35, para. 2, 97,
355);
(3) There had not been notice to the public, or the
plaintiffs that there would be a discussion concerning
the location of the Utelite facility at the Planning
Commission meeting. (R. 10, 35, para. 3, 97, 129);
(4) The minutes from the Planning Commission meeting
contained no reference to a discussion of the proposed
location of the Utelite facility (R. 11-13, 35, para. 4,
124-127) .
(5) Utelite had applied for, and the County granted, a
building permit six months after the facility had been
built and was operating (R. 14, 36, para. 7, 9 8 ) ;
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(6) The building permit approved the use/structure as a
"permitted" use in an "AG-1" zone.1 (R. 36, para. 7,
130) ;
(7) The specific site occupied by the Utelite facility
was not used as a loading facility for more than one
year prior to the erection of the facility.
(R. 98,
para. 9 ) .
(8) The activities of the Utelite loading facility are
neither permitted nor conditional uses under Chapter 12.20
of the Summit County Development Code within an RR-2 or AG-1
zone.
(R. 37, para. 1 0 ) .
There was no genuine issue as to these material facts.

The

plaintiffs, therefore, filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P.

(R. 1 0 4 ) .

This Motion also

relied upon specific provisions of the adopted Development Code
which are not in dispute and which were adopted pursuant to Utah
law.

Utah Code Ann. §§17-27-7, 7.10, and 8 (1987)

(R. 106-117).

Under the Development Code, the area in which the facility
was located was and continues to be zoned as RR-2
residential").

(R. 36, para. 9 ) .

("rural

There was no provision that

identified a loading facility like this as a "permitted" use.
Development Code at 12.7; 12.20.

Since the use was not

permitted, the decision allowing the placement of the facility
and the building permit was "null and void" under the Code.
Development Code at 1.15.

Removal was, therefore, expressly

1

The County has admitted that pursuant to Chapter 12.7 of
the Development Code, the area occupied by the Utelite facility
is zoned "RR-2." (R. at 37, para. 10). However, Utelite's
October 1989 building permit application indicates under the
heading "Zoning Approval" that the area is zoned "AG-1."
(A. 2 ) .
Regardless of whether the area occupied by the facility was zoned
AG-1 or RR-2, the applicable zoning ordinances make it clear that
the facility is neither a permitted nor a conditional use in
these zones. Development Code at 12.20.
(A. 3 ) .
8

authorized.

Development Code at 1.16; Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23

(1987) .
As a separate and independent basis for their claims, the
plaintiffs based their Motion for Summary Judgment upon Utah's
Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1, et seq.
(1953, as amended); (R. 114-16).

Under this Act, actions taken

in public meetings without notice are voidable.

Utah Code Ann. §

52-4-8 (1953, as amended).
In addition, the plaintiffs sought removal because their due
process rights had been violated.

(R. 5, 116). A zoning

decision made without notice violates due process.

Utah Const,

art. I, § 7; U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
The Trial Court, Judge Homer Wilkinson presiding, granted
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and awarded the relief
requiring Summit County to effectuate the removal of the
facility.

The Trial Court also granted a stay of this relief for

60 days to permit Summit County to appeal.2

(A. 4, "Order").

Summit County petitioned for an interlocutory appeal from
the Order for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 2 84).

2

The Supreme

In their opening brief the appellants note that the
plaintiffs timely lodged Proposed Findings and an Order to which
objections were made and heard on October 15, 1991. The
appellants neglect to point out that new Findings of Fact and
Conclusions were then sent to the Trial Court after objections
were heard but for some inexplicable reason were never filed. (R.
at 597) Changes as to the law on the finality of Orders
occurred, and lengthy negotiations then took place as to the form
of the Order. (Id.) The matter then came before the Court on a
Order to Show Cause hearing scheduled by computer and after a
full consultation with the Trial Court, the Order for the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment was executed. Id.
9

Court considered the Petition and denied it on October 27, 1993.
(A. 5 ) .
Plaintiffs then asked the Trial Court, Judge David Young, to
remove the facility in accordance with the prior Order.

Judge

Young indicated plaintiffs would need to file an Order to Show
Cause to seek enforcement of the prior Order.

Judge Young

further indicated that plaintiffs could amend their complaint to
allow for their damage claims to be heard so that all claims
would be resolved.

(R. 3 03).

The plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 11, 1994.
(R. 304).

In the amended complaint the plaintiffs did not alter

the allegations that had already been made and ruled upon.

The

only new claims arose from dust and noise, encumbrance of the
water system that serves plaintiffs' homes, and interference with
the comfortable enjoyment of plaintiffs' property caused by the
facility.

Plaintiffs specifically added damage claims for

nuisance, statutory nuisance, trespass, negligence, and
infliction of emotional distress.

(R. 311-319).

The plaintiffs

also pleaded for their attorneys fees against Summit County
specifically under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. (R. 317-319).
On April 14, 1994, the plaintiffs formally requested the
Trial Court issue an Order to Show Cause why the County should
not be required to effectuate removal of the facility as required
by the previous Order.

(R. 400-407).

Although Judge Wilkinson

had heard the matter, ordered the facility removed, and denied
objections to his Order, and the Utah Supreme Court had denied
10

the County's interlocutory appeal, Judge Young (signed by Judge
Iwasaki) entered an Order stating "implementation of the Order to
Show Cause is hereby stayed pending a final resolution of all
remaining claims against all parties."3

(R. 599).

An expedited formal and informal discovery schedule on the
damage claims then took place.

Utelite served written discovery

and Summit County and Utelite both participated in depositions of
the plaintiffs.

Among other things, this discovery focused upon

a claim by plaintiff Richins and the Dicker Hill Trust (a family
trust holding title to the Richins' family farm) that the
facility was built upon a public road and restricted access to
the farm. (R. 834-836).

When the plaintiffs sought to undertake

written discovery against the County, however, the Trial Court,
Judge Glen Iwasaki, granted the County's Motion for Protective
Order purportedly on the basis that the substantive claims
against Summit County had been resolved.

(R. 609-702, 775-76).

At the conclusion of the expedited discovery schedule, the
plaintiffs sought to add two additional claims that were fully
discovered by the defendants and that arose out of the same
operative facts as the pending claims.

(R. 779-780).

First,

plaintiffs alleged that the Utelite facility was located on a
public road and encroached upon a court-ordered easement

3

In their brief the defendants comment upon the system of
rotating judges. (Defendants' brief at 4 ) . The reality of this
case is that the defendants were the prime beneficiaries of the
rotating judges because they urged Judge Young to not follow
Judge Wilkinson's Order of removal, and Judge Young did not do
so.
11

established in a prior condemnation case.

Second, plaintiffs

alleged that by allowing Utelite to locate its facility on the
public road, the County had unlawfully abandoned the road in
violation of Utah law.
806).

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.

(R. 805-

Although a final pretrial date and trial date had not been

established, the Trial Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian
presiding, denied leave to amend.

(R. 1018-1019) .

Before the trial, Utelite moved for summary judgment
asserting, inter alia, that plaintiffs' claim for infliction of
emotional distress had not been sufficiently pleaded and that
plaintiffs had failed to elicit evidence of conduct that was
sufficiently outrageous for emotional distress.

(R. 1218-1219).

Utelite also filed extensive motions in limine. (R. 1208-1222).
The plaintiffs vigorously disputed Utelite's motions on
summary judgment and through deposition introduced facts in
opposition to the Motion as support for their claim.
45).

(R. 1427-

The Trial Court granted the Motion on the basis that there

existed no genuine issues of material issues of fact with respect
to the alleged "outrageousness" of Utelite's conduct.

(R. 1766-

68; A. 6) .
The Trial Court also granted two of Utelite's Motions in
Limine.

It prohibited the introduction of evidence on the

facility's blocking access to the Richins property and prohibited
evidence about the plaintiffs worries of the impact of the
Utelite facility on the town of Echo's water supply.

(R. 1764).

The remaining claims came on for trial before Judge Frank G.
12

Noel on September 12, 1995.

At the time of trial, Judge Noel

ruled that Judge Wilkinson's previous Order for Partial Summary
Judgment was the law of the case and that the defendants had not
shown the facility was an accessory to a non-conforming use.
23 70).

(R.

Since the use was prohibited, Judge Noel found that the

nature of the facility, a rock aggregate loading operation, and
the noise, dust and other conditions attendant to it, constituted
a nuisance per se in this rural residential neighborhood. (R.
2371).
By stipulation of the parties, and to expedite the trial,
the Trial Court dismissed all other remaining claims without
prejudice and Utelite waived its right to assert a statute of
limitations bar with respect to any such claim.4
Trial proceeded on the damage issues.

(R. 2098) .

During the trial the

Court advised the jury that there was an order to remove the
facility (R. 1985), that had been stayed pending appeal. (R.
1985).

The Special Verdict allowed damages to be awarded only

until the day of trial.

(A. 8, para. 2 ) . The Court also

permitted the jury to view the facility while operating, over the
plaintiffs' objection that such a view was prejudicial, was not
"evidence" or reflective of the actual condition of the site in
the past or at the time of trial.

(R. 2663-2666).

At the conclusion of the trial the jury found the facility
had been the proximate cause of damages to plaintiffs until the

4

Should this case be reversed, plaintiffs will bring all of
their claims.
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day of trial.

(A. 8 ) .

It awarded damages to the plaintiffs in

the following amounts:

Jane Harper, $5,000.00; Richard Harper,

$5,000.00;

Frank Cattelan, $3000.00 and Richard Richins and the

Dicker Hill Trust, $1500. 00.5
At Utelite's request, the Court allowed some evidence on
"further" equitable relief.

Because of the rulings on the

Motions in Limine, however, plaintiffs could not introduce all of
the evidence that would support additional equitable relief,
including the evidence that the facility blocked access and was
on a public road.

In addition, Judge Noel heard no evidence as

to illegal procedures followed by Utelite and the County to
locate the facility.
The Trial Court did not grant any further equitable relief
except for the equitable relief to which the plaintiffs were
entitled under the terms of Judge Wilkinson's Order.
2102; 2336, A. 8, para. 6, A. 9, para. 4 ) .

(R. 2101-

The Trial Court

awarded some but not all of the plaintiffs' attorneys fees and
costs under the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act but not
attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988.

(A. 10; R.

2322-2323).

5

The appellants claim these awarded amount are "nominal."
They fail to mention that the jury was expressly advised it could
not award future damages and that there was an Order to remove
the facility. It was not surprising the jury awarded these
amounts in light of these instructions, and should the facility
be removed, these "nominal" amounts will not limit Utelite's
economic ability to move to another site.
14

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs in this action are owners of property in
Echo, Utah.

(R. 23 74).

Richard and Jane Harper obtained a

certificate of zoning compliance from Summit County as
prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit for their home.
(R. 2381-83).

A building permit was secured in 1987 (Trial Exh.

4) that properly identified the area as rural residential, and
they built their home at that time in reliance thereon.

(R.

2383-84).
Frank Cattelan, 68, has lived in Echo since August 28, 1947,
and has owned property since 1954.

(R. 2544-45).

Mr. Cattelan

operates a small cafe in Echo and serves as the President of the
Echo Mutual Water Company, which provides the town with culinary
water (R. 2544, 2548).
Plaintiff Rich Richins, 62, was born in Echo and purchased
his family farm from his father in 1971.

(R. 2663, 2670) . Mr.

Richins is the president of the Echo Ditch Company, an irrigation
company formed to distribute irrigation water to land owners
about and including Echo. (R. 2679).

The primary access to Mr.

Richins farm is on the road upon which the Utelite facility was
built.

(R. 2672-73).

Mr. Richins and his family were provided

court-ordered access to this class B road in 1971.

(R. 945,

954) .
In 1988, unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, Utelite began to
prepare to construct a railroad loadout facility on a road near
the railroad line running through Echo.
15

(A. 1 at No. 16; Sept.

10, 1988, letter written by Doug Burton, the surveyor; R. 2876) .
The road had been travelled by the public for more than 10 years.
Utelite did so because the Union Pacific Railroad expressed a
desire to close the track from Echo to Park City, and there was a
passing track in Echo, which was occasionally used to temporarily
keep broken down railroad cars on a short term basis.
2817; 2838).

(R. 24 84;

Utelite accepted cash, and received a discount on

its freight charges from the railroad for the move.

(R. 2839).

Although other sites were available it chose Echo for economic
reasons.

(R. 2885-90).

There had never been commercial loading facilities on this
track or anywhere else in Echo before this time.
2796).

(R. 23 81,

The last time any loading had been done in Echo was

decades earlier when the railroad loaded the last coal fired
train engine that went through the town.

(R. 2552; 2615-2616;

2795) .
Utelite had been loading its rock product in Wanship, Utah
before its move.

It used a temporary conveyor for its operation

which was substantially smaller than the one in Echo.

(R. 2884) .

Some of the attributes of the facility at which it operated are
compared to the facility in Echo in the following chart:
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Wanship

Echo

Location

Portable

Fixed

Area

10,000 sq. ft.

50,000 sq. ft.

Hopper

<15 tons

>40 tons

Cars loaded

386 from 1983-88

>300 per yr.

Bag House

No

Yes

(R. 2884/ 2560-61; 2884-88).
On November 1, 1988, Utelite contacted Jerry Smith, an
employee

of the Summit County Planning Commission, to see what

was required to construct the new facility.6

(A. 1 at No. 33) .

At Mr. Smiths request, Utelite went before the Summit County
Planning Commission seeking approval for construction of the
facility in Echo.

(A. 1 at No. 7 & 33) .

The proposed agenda f or the December 13, 1988 meeting of the
planning Commission provided no notice to the public that there
would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation and
construction of the Utelite facility.

(R. 97; 129, A. 11, 12).

The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the Planning
Commission contain no reference to a discussion or any testimony
concerning the proposed relocation and construction of the
Utelite facility.

(R. 124-127, A. 12).

6

Before the facility was moved, Utelite also contacted the
Summit County Attorney in his "private practice" to assist
Utelite in negotiating with the railroad. Additionally, the
County Attorney represented Utelite in his "private practice"
when it was cited for not having an air quality permit for the
Echo facility.
(R. 2908-2909).
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Despite the lack of notice, and lack of discussion about the
facility in the minutes, Utelite received verbal permission at
the December 13, 1988 meeting of the Planning Commission to begin
construction of the facility.

(A. 1 at No. 14).

On January 13, 1989, Jack Willis on behalf of Robert
McGregor, Chairman of the Planning Commission, sent a letter to
Utelite confirming the discussion at the December 13, 1988
meeting of the Planning Commission regarding the proposed
relocation of the Utelite facility.

(R. 9, 97; 123, A. 13; A. 1

at Nos. 14 & 33).
This letter indicated that it was the consensus of the
Planning Commission that the Utelite operation presently set up
in Wanship could be moved to the Echo location and would be
considered a "permitted use" at the Echo site.

(R. 123, A. 13;

A. 1 at Nos. 14 & 33).
Utelite began constructing the facility without a building
permit on or about February 21, 1989.

(R. 97; 356; A. 1 at No.

2) .
The facility was substantially completed by April 25, 1989,
at which time the first loading of railroad cars took place.

(A.

1 at No. 2; R. 97).
In October 1989, six months after the facility was built,
Utelite made application for a building permit from Summit
County, which permit was issued on November 28, 1989 as building
permit # 89291 for the construction of the loadout facility in
Echo.

(R. 97; 356; 2879; A. 2 ) .
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This application states that the facility is located within
an "AG-1" zone and that the use/structure is a "permitted use."
(R. 130, A. 2 ) . At the time, the area in which the Utelite
facility was built was zoned "RR-2" under chapter 12.7 of the
Summit County Development Code.

(A. 3 at 12.7).

The Development

Code required a building permit before the construction of any
building or structure.

Development Code at 1.9. (A. 3 ) . A

prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit was a
certificate of zoning compliance.

Development Code at 1.9.

The activities conducted by Utelite were not listed as
"permitted" uses within an "RR-2" area in the Development Code.7
Development Code at 12.20.

Also, the activities of the Utelite

facility were not a permitted nor a conditional use within an
"AG-1" zone under the provisions the Development Code.
Development Code at 12.20.
prohibited use.

Thus, the Utelite facility is a

(R. 2370-71).

The site occupied by Utelite had not been used as a loading
facility for more than one year prior to the erection of
Utelite's facility.

(R. 98).

As soon as Utelite began operating there developed many
problems.
(.Id.).

(R. 2387-2411).

The operation was dusty and noisy.

Large, uncovered tractor trailers hauling the Utelite

7

A permitted use is one "for which no conditional use
permit is required." Development Code at 1-6(53). Conditional
uses are ones that would be improper under general conditions in
the place of use. Development Code at 6.1. To obtain a
conditional use permit, there must be notice and public hearing.
Id.
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product would go through town and park in front of the
plaintiff's residence.
at the facility.

(R. 2386, 2389).

Rail cars were stored

(R. 2389) . Utelite workers would bang the rail

cars creating noise and dust. (R. 2388).

When they cleaned the

railcars, aggregate falls between the tracks.

(R. 2675).

A huge

floodlight at the facility would illuminate the yard and home of
the Harpers.

(R. 2389).

on weekends.

(R. 2391).

The facility would operate at night and

When it began to operate, Utelite did not keep the area
clean, or bother to get a air quality permit although one was
required. (R. 2897-2912).

On June 1, 1989 the Division of Air

Quality sent a letter to Utelite indicating that it was not
supposed to operate without a permit.

(R. 2907-2908).

Utelite

did not obtain an air quality permit until six or eight months
after the facility began its operations. (R. 2987-2912).
Utelite aggregate contains approximately sixty percent
silica.

(R. 2880-81).

Utelite requires its own employees to

wear respirators in dusty areas, and the material is known to
irritate the respiratory system, the eyes, and the skin.
2881-82).

(R.

During the load-out process, Utelite dust is left on

the tracks.

(R. 2910).

The light-weight aggregate is easily

airborne, blows over the railroad tracks as high as the railroad
cars, and blows over the premises.

(R. 2910-11).

Mrs. Harper

and her children cough, sneeze, and have watering eyes because of
the aggregate dust.
2394-2398) .

(R. 2390).

It blows on their home.

(R.

Pictures were taken just two weeks before trial
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showing "Utelite" on the children's window sills. (R. 2386).
Just before trial, samples were taken from Mrs. Harper's windows
that were made up of "Utelite."

(R. 2775-2780).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court properly entered summary judgment requiring
removal of the facility from Echo, Utah.

There were no genuine

issues of material fact and the plaintiffs were entitled to
removal because the County, without notice, allowed the facility
to locate in a rural residential zone without a building permit
or certificate of zoning compliance.

This violated the

Development Code, Utah zoning law, Utah's laws on open and public
meetings and due process guarantees.
The County has already attempted to appeal this Order to the
Supreme Court on an interlocutory appeal and lost.

The

Appellants have not given any more reason in their brief to
reverse the Trial Court than they gave the Supreme Court on the
fundamental issue of removal.

There were no disputes of fact on

this issue, all indispensable parties were before the Trial
Court, and the relevant zoning laws, including the County's
Development Code, completely supported the Trial Court's
decision.
The Trial Court, however, did commit error during the
damage phase of this case by 1) refusing to allow plaintiffs to
conduct discovery, 2) by denying leave to amend plaintiffs'
claims to assert ones that provided additional basis for damages,
3) by limiting evidence the plaintiffs could introduce, and 4) by
21

allowing the jury to view the facility during atypical operating
conditions.

All of these errors unfairly prejudiced the

plaintiffs, reduced the amount of the jury's award, and led to
the Trial Court's erroneous findings and conclusions on further
equitable relief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT THE UTELITE
FACILITY BE REMOVED WHERE THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF
DISPUTED FACT
The Trial Court's Order to remove the facility is based upon

undisputed facts and well established Utah law.

The facts

demonstrate the County violated Utah law and its own Development
Code when it allowed the facility to be a "permitted" use in a
rural residential zone and when it belatedly issued a building
permit without obtaining a certificate of zoning compliance.
Under Utah law and the Development Code, the Trial Court had the
full authority to issue its Order to the County to remove the
facility.
A.

Allowing the loading facility to operate in a rural
residential zone violated Utah and County Law.

The undisputed facts show that Summit County, acting
without notice, allowed Utelite to locate its facility in an area
zoned rural residential as a "permitted" use.

A permitted use is

a use expressly authorized within a particular zone.
Code 12.20.

Development

The Development Code lists with great particularity

those uses that are "permitted" in a residential rural zone and a
loading facility like Utelite's is not included in the list.
Development Code, § 12.20.
22

The Development Code constitutes the master planning
document for Summit County.

Development Code Chapter 1.8.

such, it is binding upon the County.
(1987).

As

Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-7

Once such a master plan has been duly enacted by the

governing authorities, further actions by the governing authority
must be taken in accordance with that plan to promote the health,
safety and welfare of the community.

It becomes the guiding

instrument for future development and must be followed.

See,

Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559
(Utah 1967); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 398 P.2d 27
(Utah 1965) .
Zoning authorities like the County's Planning Commission are
strictly bound by the terms and standards of a zoning ordinance.
They are not at liberty to grant or deny permits in derogation of
those legislative standards.

Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d

440, 444-45 (Utah 1981).
If there is a zoning violation, the Courts are fully
authorized to order the zoning law be met.

At the time Utelite

built its facility, Utah law and the Summit County Development
Code specifically authorized injunctive relief and abatement
proceedings.

Under Utah Law:

Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any county
zoning, subdivision, or official map ordinance is
punishable as a class C misdemeanor. The board of
county commissioners, the county attorney, or any owner
of real estate within the county in which a violation
occurs, may, in addition to other remedies provided by
law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, or any
other appropriate action or proceeding to prevent,
enjoin, abate, or remove any erection, construction,
alteration, maintenance, or use in violation of this
23

Code.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-23 (1987) .
Under Summit County's

Development Code:

Any person, firm, or corporation, whether as principle,
agent, employee, or otherwise, violating or causing the
violation of any of the provisions of this Code shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable as provided by
law. The County Attorney, or any owner of real estate
adversely affected by a violation of this Code, may
institute injunction, abatement, or any other
appropriate legal action to prevent, enjoin, abate, or
remove any erection, construction, alteration,
maintenance, or use in violation of this Code.
Development Code at 1.16.
So clear is the law that there need not be a showing of harm
for an injunction to issue.

In Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d

61 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court stated:
Under the statute, a specific showing of
irreparable injury is therefore not required and the
pleading thereof in the complaint is mere surplusage.
Nevertheless, it fairly may be said that under the
foregoing analysis, a showing that the zoning ordinance
has been violated is tantamount to a showing of
irreparable injury (to the public).
Baxter at 65.

In this case the Trial Court properly found that

the acts and omissions of the defendants were contrary to the
Development Code.

Applying

Utah Code Section 17-27-23, the

Summit County Development section 1.16, and Utah case law, the
Court correctly ordered that the Utelite facility be removed.
The defendants do not ever mention that the area was zoned
rural residential in their Brief.

They attempt to transform a

simple case into a complicated one by arguing that there is a
fact issue whether Summit County's course of dealings were a
legislative exercise of zoning power or simply administrative
24

action.

Whether the County's conduct was administrative or

legislative does not matter--the placement of the facility in a
rural residential zone violated the law, and the Trial Court had
the full authority to order the County to abide by its own laws.
Likewise, the defendants mistakenly attempt to avoid
removal by labeling Union Pacific's railtracks as a
"nonconforming use" and the facility as an "accessory" to this
nonconforming use.

In their argument, the defendants

conspicuously disregarded that a "permitted use" is explicit and
has concrete meaning in zoning law.

A "permitted use" is

specifically authorized--which this one was not.8
Moreover, even if the facts are disregarded, and the
Planning Commission's decision that the use was "permitted" is
overlooked, the defendants' argument is wrong.

Summit County's

Development Code does not allow the loading facility as an
accessory to a nonconforming use.9
8

In their brief the County and Utelite refer to a letter
written by the County Attorney in February of 1990, which was
long after the facility had been built, describes the facility as
an "accessory" to a nonconforming use. This letter does not
reflect what happened before the planning commission and simply
is the argument of the County and Utelite. It is not a fact.
9

The Appellants elusively cite Anderson's American Law of
Zoning definition of "non-conforming use" in their Brief instead
of the County's Development Code. Brief of Appellants at 19 n. 7
(quoting Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning, 4 ed. (1995) §
6.01 at 481-82). They must do so because Anderson's definition
does not address (1) the enlargement of the nonconforming use
that occurred in this case; and (2) the lapse of more than one
year since this area had been used for loading. Under the
Development Code, these two facts alone establish that the
loading facility is prohibited. Development Code at 3.7.
25

The Code defines a "nonconforming use" as:
3.7 Nonconforming use of Land
The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this
code became effective, may be continued, provided that no
such nonconforming use of land shall in any way be expanded
or extended either on the same or adjoining property, and
provided that if such nonconforming use of land, or any
portion thereof, is abandoned or changed for a period of one
(1) year or more, any future use of such land shall be in
conformity with the provisions of this Code.(emphasis
added).
Development Code at 3.7.

Under this provision the nonconforming

use of land shall in no way be expanded or extended on the same
or adjoining property and if the use is abandoned for more than
one year the future use of such land shall be in conformity with
the provisions of the code.
In State v. Holt's Estate, 381 P.2d 724 (Utah 1963), the
Court interpreted a similar code provision,10 and held that the
discontinuance of the nonconforming commercial use of property
that burned down for more than one year proved an effective
abandonment, and the property was thereafter subject to the new
residential zoning requirement.

Holt' s Estate at 725 (citing

Morrison v. H o m e , 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961)).
In this case the area in which the Utelite facility was
built had never been the site of a commercial loading facility.

10

Bountiful City, Sec. 24-18, subsec. 4 provided:

One Year Vacancy- A building, structure or portion
thereof, non-conforming as to use, which is, or
hereafter becomes vacant, and remains unoccupied for a
continuous period of one (1) year, shall not thereafter
be occupied except by a use which conforms to the use
regulations of the zone in which it is located.
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No loading of railcars had taken place anywhere in Echo for
decades when the last steam engine to roll through town was
loaded with coal for fuel.

(R. 2552; 2615-16).

There was no

loading facility in 1987 when plaintiffs Jane Harper obtained
their building permit for their home in the RR-2 neighborhood.
Defendants' error is compounded by claiming that the
facility is an "accessory" to a "preexisting use."
Defendants7 at 19-20.

Brief of

An "accessory use" is defined as:

A subordinate use customarily incidental to and located
upon the same lot occupied by the main use and devoted
exclusively to the main use of the premises.
Development Code at 1.6(63).

Loading rock aggregate cannot be

considered an "accessory" to the non-conforming use of a railroad
track.

Additionally, the use is devoted to loading rock

aggregate for Utelite' s commercial purposes.

This is not an

"accessory use" to a railroad right-of-way.11
The defendants' argument, taken to its logical conclusion,
would mean that any type of loading facility on a railroad would
be considered an "accessory use."

For example, a garbage loading

facility could be located anywhere along a railroad track that
runs through a rural residential zone.

This is clearly not the

law.
Finally, under the Development Code, "[a] non-conforming use
shall be deemed abandoned if said use has not applied to the
premises for a consecutive period of 12 months."
11

Development

The preexisting use to occasionally and temporarily hold
railcars for repair may have been an "accessory use." A loading
facility for a private company was not.
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Code at 3.9.

If a nonconforming use is deemed abandoned when not

exercised on the premises for 12 months, an "accessory" to the
nonconforming use would surely be abandoned.
B.

Appellants Violated the Development Code By
Belatedly Issuing a Building Permit Without a
Certificate Of Zoning Compliance.

The undisputed facts also demonstrate the County violated
its own Code because the facility was built without a certificate
of zoning compliance and long before the issuance of a building
permit.
The Summit County Development Code expressly provides that:
Construction or removal of any building or structure12
or any part thereof as provided or as restricted in this
Code shall not be commenced, or proceeded with, except
after the issuance of a written permit for the same by
the county building inspector . . . .
Prerequisite to
the issuance of a building permit shall be the obtaining
of a certificate of zoning compliance from the zoning
administrator or his authorized representative.
Development Code Chapter 1.9.

The facts of this case leave no

doubt that this provision was clearly disregarded by the
Defendants in regards to the construction of the Utelite
facility.
Because Summit County's acts were in derogation of the
Development Code, they are null and void.

The Development Code

at Chapter 1.15 provides that:
All departments, officials, and public employees of
Summit County vested with duty and authority to issue
12

Chapter 1.6(61) of the Development Code defines structure
as "[a]nything constructed or erected which requires location on
the ground or attached to something having location on the
ground." Utelite's loadout facility is a structure under this
definition.
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permits, licenses, or certificates of zoning compliance
shall conform to the provisions of this Code and shall
not issue a permit, license, or certificate of zoning
compliance for use, building or other purposes where the
same would be in conflict with this Code, and any such
permit, license, or certificate issued in conflict with
the provisions of this Code, shall be null and void.
Development Code at 1.15.

The actions of Summit County in

issuing the building permit were "null and void."

The Trial

Court had full authority to order Summit County to effectuate
removal of the facility, and its Order must be upheld.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO REMOVE THE FACILITY IS
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE DEVELOPMENT CODE AND UTAH
LAW

In their brief the defendants challenge the remedy awarded
by the Trial Court by maintaining that Judge Wilkinson's
"confusion" extends to his "articulation of the relief granted."
Brief of defendants at 30.

Judge Wilkinson was not "confused."

He properly understood this case "boiled down" to a violation of
the Development Code and zoning laws.
Defendants' Brief at 3, line 24).

(Attached as "A-l" to

In his Order, Judge Wilkinson

indicated that Summit County "shall be required to effectuate the
removal of Utelite from their currently occupied site."

To allow

Utelite an appeal, Judge Wilkinson stayed the effect of the Order
for sixty (60) days.

Unless the appeal was successful, and it

was not, the facility had to move.
There is nothing confusing about this relief, and so far the
Defendants have been the ones to benefit from the stay.
the appeal, it has been fully understood.
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Since

For example, Judge

Noel advised the jury in this case that there was an Order
requiring Summit County to remove the facility.

(R. at 1985).

The undisputed facts admitted by the defendants in their
Answers and in discovery clearly establish a violation of the
Development Code.

The Trial Court fully intended that the

facility be removed but permitted an appeal.

Summit County had

the opportunity to appeal, and lost.
At that point in time the facility should have been removed
and Judge Young erred in failing to implement the removal Order.
The Order was the law of the case.

See Richardson v. Grand

Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395 (Utah 1977).

Since the Utah Supreme

Court would not reverse the Order upon the fervent appeal of the
County, this Court should not do so at this time.
In their Brief the defendants challenge the relief
because it "overlooked the difficult position of Summit County."
Brief of defendants at 31.

Specifically, the defendants indicate

that Utelite could have a claim of "equitable estoppel" against
Summit County because the County told Utelite that the facility
would constitute a "permitted use."

Brief of defendants' at 31.

In making this argument the defendants implicitly
acknowledge that the Planning Commission erred by indicating the
"use" was "permitted".

The defendants also implicitly

acknowledge the real reason for these proceedings:

the County

unlawfully allowed Utelite to move to Echo in violation of its
own law.

There is the potential for a claim against the County

from Utelite.

However, that issue is between Utelite and the
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County.

It should not be the plaintiffs' problem.

So far Utelite has not had to formally make this claim.
Instead, it has purposely and deliberately accepted the risks of
staying in Echo.

It has done so knowing the zoning in the area

was rural residential, and knowing there are alternate locations
to which it could move.

(R. 2885-2890).

Utelite has chosen to

do this after the Court ordered removal.
Instead of complying with the law, Utelite and the County
have undertaken a joint strategy, beneficial to both, to place
blame on others, including the plaintiffs (for their alleged
delay in bringing the action), and the Railroad (for requesting
Utelite to abandon its Wanship site).
This blame is misplaced.

In Utah, zoning violations are

tolerated only in "exceptional" cases.

Neither the County nor

Utelite can persuasively argue that there are exceptional
circumstances here.

Our Supreme Court has made it clear that:

Estoppel, waiver or laches ordinarily do not
constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive relief
against alleged violations of the zoning laws, unless
the circumstances are exceptional. Zoning ordinances
are governmental acts which rest upon the police power,
and as to violations thereof any inducements, reliances,
negligence of enforcement, or like factors are merely
aggravations of the violation rather than excuses or
justifications thereof.
Baxter at 65 (quoting Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d
136, 138 (Utah 1976)).

In this simple case the law was met.

The

Development Code, Utah statutes and case law all permit removal.

31

III.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING
THAT SUMMIT COUNTY'S ACTIONS VIOLATED THE OPEN
MEETINGS LAW WHEN THE COUNTY FAILED TO GIVE
NOTICE OF THE ACTION TAKEN AT THE PLANNING
MEETING THAT ALLOWED UTELITE TO LOCATE ITS
FACILITY IN AN AREA ZONED RR-2
The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann.

sections 52-4-1, et seq., expressly provides that the actions of
the state, its agencies and political subdivisions "be taken
openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly." Utah
Code Ann. § 52-4-1.

Each public body must "give not less than 24

hours public notice of the agenda, date, time and place of each
of its meeting," Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-6(2) and must keep written
minutes which must include " . . .

the substance of all matters

proposed, discussed, or decided, and a record, by individual
member, or votes taken and the names of all citizens who appeared
and the substance in brief of their testimony; . . . " Utah Code
Ann. § 52-4-7.

Any final action taken in violation of these

provision is voidable by a court of competent jurisdiction.

Utah

Code Ann. § 52-4-8.
Furthermore, section 52-4-9 of the Utah Code provides:
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may
commence suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel
compliance with or enjoin violations of this chapter or to
determine its applicability to discussions or decisions of a
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees
and court costs to a successful plaintiff.
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-9(2).
There is no dispute that the posted agenda for the Planning
Commission meeting provided no notice to the public that there
would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation of the
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Utelite facility and that the minutes of the December 13, 1988
meeting contain no reference to a discussion concerning the
proposed relocation of Utelite facility.

(R. 97; see R. 129, A.

11) .
Being unable to contest this, the defendants argue that the
decision to allow Utelite to move was a "routine" or
"operational" one for which notice is not required.

Brief of

defendants at 30.
There is no support for this argument in the statute.

It

does not make exceptions for "operational" or "routine"
decisions.

It does not make distinctions because they would

directly contradict the policy of the Open and Public Meetings
law.

The State's expressed policy is to have all of the

''people's business" conducted openly.
(1996).

Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1

The Act states that a "meeting" means the convening of

the "public body" when a quorum is present "for the purpose of
discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body has
jurisdiction or advisory power." Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(1)
(emphasis added).

This certainly applies to the Summit County

Planning Commission and the decision in this case.
Moreover, the Act expressly indicates neither chance or
social meetings can be used to circumvent the Act. Utah Code Ann.
§ 52-4-2(1).

This provision underscores the importance of a

broad application.

The law expressly disallows the type of

action the defendants suggest occurred in this case when the
President of Utelite "dropped into" the Planning Commission
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Meeting.

Brief of defendants at 17.

Finally, granting Utelite a "permitted use" in a Planning
Commission Meeting is the type of "final" action requiring
appropriate notice.

With notice, the plaintiffs could have been

brought into the public process.

The Planning Commission would

have known the area was not zoned for use as a loading facility
and the plaintiffs7 objections to it.

Input from neighbors

affected by zoning decisions and variances is crucial for the
zoning process to work legitimately.

Tolman v. Salt Lake County,

20 Utah 2d, 437 P.2d 442, 445 (1968).
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the problems created by
the appellants' analysis is to examine the suggestion they make
that "the plaintiffs do not dispute the adequacy of the notice
for the December 13, 1988, Summit County Planning Commission
meeting . . . they focus on the level of detail required in the
agenda for that meeting."

Brief of defendants at 29.

Of course

the plaintiffs dispute the adequacy of the notice because it did
not mention Utelite at. all.

In this case it was not a question

of "level" of detail because there was no detail.
Defendants also argue that the plaintiffs should be barred
by the Open and Public Meetings Act statute of limitations.
However, the facts that the defendants rely upon, such as
"commencement of construction," and "the first loading of
railroad cars" were not sufficient to appraise the plaintiffs of
a cause of action under the Act.
Under Utah law, where there are exceptional circumstances
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that would make application of the general rule regarding running
of statute of limitations irrational or unjust, the statue of
limitations will be tolled.

Warren v. Provo, 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah

1992); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).

See also,

Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983)
(concealment by a party prevents that party from relying on the
statue of limitations).
This case presented such exceptional circumstances and the
Trial Court properly tolled the limitations period.

The actions

of which plaintiffs complain were the Planning Commission's
failure to provide notice as required by the Utah Code Ann. § 524-6(2) and to keep written minutes in accordance with the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-7.

Thus, the very action of

which the plaintiffs complain also served to conceal the
violations of the Act. ., It was not until months after an
investigation of this matter that the Planning Commission's
actions came to light.

Upon discovery of the failure to comply

with the Act, the plaintiffs sought assistance from their elected
officials.

(R. 2672, 2684).

They went to the County Attorney13

13

All of the "facts" regarding placement did not come to
light until discovery. For instance, Plaintiffs sought the
assistance of the Summit County Attorney to remove the facility
before they filed suit. (R. at 2644-45). Even though they met
with him and physically inspected the site with him, they were
never advised that the Summit County Attorney acted as Utelite's
private counsel on this matter and had provided legal advise in
his private practice to Utelite prior to the move. (R. 2685-86).
Nor did they know the County Attorney, as part of his private
practice, appeared on behalf of Utelite when it was cited for air
quality violations arising out of the failure to obtain a permit
to operate the loading facility.
(R. 2908-09).
35

and to the County Commission.

(Id.).

When neither one would act, this action, including the Open
and Public Meetings Act claim was filed.

Under these exceptional

circumstances, the Trial Court correctly held that the statute of
limitations contained in the open meeting law had not been
violated due to the equitable tolling doctrine, and that Summit
County's decision was made in violation of the Act.
A. 4, "Findings").

(R. 280-282;

That decision should be affirmed, together

with the award of attorney's fees for having to prove the
application of the Act.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT
SUMMIT COUNTY'S ACTIONS ARE VOID BECAUSE THE ACTIONS
DEPRIVED PLAINTIFFS OF DUE PROCESS.
The Utah Supreme Court has always applied notice and due
process principles to zoning decisions.

In Tolman v. Salt Lake

County, 20 Utah 2d. 310, 437 P.2d 442 (1968), the Utah Supreme
Court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U. S. 306, 70 S.
Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950) for the following:
The fundamental requisite of due process of law
is the opportunity to heard. *** An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present objections. *** A notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information *** and it must afford
reasonable time to those interested to make their
appearance.
In Tolman, like here, zoning authorities made zoning decisions
that affectively allowed a change of use in a neighborhood.
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Adjoining neighbors were not provided with adequate notice, and
did not attend the meeting at which approval was granted.

They

subsequently went to the county commission, who did not assist
them, and were forced to file a court action to have the action
reversed.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the failure to

provide adequate notice violated due process.
Similarly, in Carter v. City of Salina, 773 F.2d 251 (10th
Cir. 1985), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Utah
law, held that a zoning ordinance enacted in violation of
mandatory notice and hearing requirements was void, and property
owners were therefore entitled to injunctive relief against the
city.

Carter at 256.

The Carter Court stated:

It is the general rule that zoning ordinances are in
derogation of common law property rights and find their
authority through the state police power; accordingly,
municipalities and other political subdivisions must
scrupulously comply with statutory requirements,
including notice and hearing, in order to provide due
process of law.
Id. at 254 (citing Melville v. Salt Lake County, 536 P.2d 133
(Utah 1975) .
This is not a complicated case.

The County did not meet the

notice requirements of the Open and Public Meetings Act.

Had it

considered the use "conditional,"14 it would have had to give
notice under the County's zoning ordinances.
6.1.

Development Code, §

Its silent agenda did not meet the rudimentary requirements

of due process because it did not mention Utelite at all.

14

A conditional use, however, is only allowed after notice
and hearing.
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Without noti ce, the plaintiffs were not provided with the
"fundamental and elementary" requirements of due process cited in
Tolman, supra; and were not provided with an opportunity to
object.

The Trial Court properly found that such action violated

due process and was well within its authority to deem the
decision to permit Utelite to move to Echo as null and void.
V, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT GRANT
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN ORDER AWARDING COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 AND 1988
The Trial Court properly held that Summit County violated
the plaintiffs' rights under the Open and Public Meetings Act,
and violated plaintiffs' due process rights.

Even though it

correctly found their constitutional rights to due process were
violated, and those rights are guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, the Trial Court did not award the plaintiffs the
attorney's fees to which they were entitled under the Civil Right
Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, as amended.
Section 1988 of Title 42 U.S.C. authorizes an award of
reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in actions
enforcing rights under 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

A prevailing party is

one who succeeds in any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the party sought in bringing the
suit.
awards.

This section is interpreted broadly in favor of such
See e.g., The People of the State of New York v. 11

Cornwall Company, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Trial Court did not award plaintiffs' claim for
attorney's fees and costs under section 1988 because it found
38

plaintiffs' original amended complaint did not assert a federal
claim for due process.

This result was in error because the

original amended complaint carefully set out the conduct engaged
in by county officials (who were operating under color of state
law) and alleged plaintiffs' due process rights had been
violated.

Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint, which the

Trial Court permitted, specifically cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a
basis for attorney's fees.
This Court can review the Amended Complaint and Second
Amended Complaint as a matter of law.
trial.

There is no need for a new

Both must be construed liberally.

All that was required

was a short and plain statement showing the pleader was entitled
to relief.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence

and Coordination Unit., et al.,

U.S.

, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122

L.Ed.2d 517 (1993).
Since the Amended and Second Amended Complaint alleges a
violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights and sets out the
unconstitutional conduct of Summit County, they both are
sufficient for an attorneys fee award.

See e.g.. First English

Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1986) (zoning measures must observe due process).
"Express reference to conduct as relating to section 1983 is not
required."

International Society for Krishna Consciousness,

Inc., v. Colorado State Fair and Industrial Exposition, 673 P.2d
368 (Colo. 1983) (cited by the Utah Court of Appeals in Lorenc v.
Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah App. 1990)); L.K. et al. v. Gregg, 425
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N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1988) (the test is not whether specific words
are used for a constitutional claim).
VI. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY WAS NOT A NECESSARY
AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE UTELITE FACILITY WOULD BE REMOVED FOR THE
DEFENDANTS VIOLATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CODE AND UTAH
LAW
In their opening Brief, Defendants claim that the Union
Pacific Railroad was an indispensable party under Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(Appellants' Brief at 33).

Appellants assert that the plaintiffs alleged "the Railroad could
not use its right-of-way in Echo to load the goods of rail
customers such as Utelite."

(Id.).

The Appellants do not make a

record cite for this bald allegation and cannot.

The reason they

cannot is that it is Utelite that violated the zoning laws when
it moved to Echo and began loading its product.
Additionally, under Rule 19, a person shall only be joined
as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action.

In reviewing

a decision made under Rule 19, the trial court's determination
must not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.
Seftel V. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), affd.
sub nom., Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d. 1127 (Utah
1990) .
In this case the complete relief that plaintiffs sought, and
were awarded, was the removal of Utelite's illegally-placed
facility and damages.

There was no relief sought against the
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Union Pacific.

The Union Pacific did not need to be a party for

the enforcement of the zoning laws. See e.g., Parish of Jefferson
v. Bertucci Bros. Construction Co., Inc., 176 So.2d 688, 690 (La.
App. 1965) (property owner not an indispensable party to enjoin
tenant's zoning violation).
The Appellants, glossing over the first part of Rule 19,
rely upon its second part, which indicates a party shall be
joined if "he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action."

At no time did the defendants move to join the Union

Pacific, and it did not ask to intervene so that it could claim
an interest.

Under Utah law, the railroad was not

"indispensable."

Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049

(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
VII. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A CLAIM
OF NUISANCE PER SE CAN BE BASED ON A PROHIBITED USE.
Defendants assert that Judge Noel erred when he found that
the Utelite facility constituted a nuisance per se.

In reaching

this result, Judge Noel carefully considered all of the arguments
the defendants now make, and the cases upon which the defendants
rely.
Defendants erroneously argue that the conduct engaged in by
Utelite was not prohibited by a statute and that a county
ordinance could not serve as the basis for a nuisance per se
claim.

This whole case arose out of the violation of County and

the Utelite Corporation of specific zoning provisions that are
have the force of state statutes.

Under the Development Code, §§

12.7 and 12.20 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-7, 8 and 23, the
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loading activities and the conditions arising from them are
prohibited.

Under Utah law the statutes could serve as the basis

for a nuisance per se claim.

Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc.,

657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982);

Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d

939, 943 (Utah 1990).
Judge Noel carefully considered the dicta from the cases
cited by Defendants, including Padien V. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938,
93 9 (Utah 1976), for the proposition that a zoning ordinance in
an of itself cannot be the basis for a finding of nuisance per
se.

Padien does not stand for the principle that a zoning

violation can never be the basis for a nuisance per se claim.
Rather, all that Padien indicates is that zoning ordinance must
prohibit the conduct and the plaintiff must suffer an injury
distinct from members of the public.

See Erickson v. Craig

Construction, 877 P.2d 144 (Utah 1994).

This is such a case.

VIII. DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE CAPPED AND THERE IS
EVIDENCE THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED FOR FURTHER EQUITABLE
RELIEF SHOULD THE COURT REVERSE THIS CASE.
In their brief the defendants claim that the jury award
and Findings and Conclusions of Law Re: Equitable Relief made by
Judge Noel cannot be disturbed if there is another trial.

There

is no basis for a retrial on the removal issue because it was
based upon undisputed fact.

If the court reverses because of

error during the damages phase, however, there were errors that
must be corrected so that the jury and the court can be given a
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full picture of the continuing harm suffered.15
A.

The Trial Court Committed Error When It Refused to
Permit Discovery Against Summit County.

After the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint,
they attempted to engage in discovery with Summit County.

The

Trial Court granted Summit County's Motion for a protective order
under Rule 26(c), U.R.C.P., and would not permit any discovery
against the County purportedly on the basis that all substantive
claims against the County had been resolved.

At the time this

order was entered, Summit County was still a party and there were
claims pending against it.
It was fundamental error to preclude plaintiffs from
conducting any discovery against Summit County.

It precluded

plaintiffs from the discovery of information and evidence to
support the removal and damage claims in violation of the broad
spirit of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

State ex. rel. Bd.

Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966) (the purpose
of discovery is to permit the parties to discover "relevant"
information).
be at issue.

If there is a retrial, the substantive claims will
This court must reverse the Protective Order

precluding discovery against the County.
B.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it
Denied Plaintiffs' Motion to File a Third Amended
Complaint.

At the conclusion of fact discovery (but before any party

15

The plaintiffs are not advocating a retrial. The
primary relief they seek is removal. Once that occurs, it is
unlikely the case will go further, because damages will end.
43

had designated experts or the setting of a final pretrial or
trial) the plaintiffs sought to file a third amended Complaint
pursuant to Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P. (R. 179). Plaintiffs sought to
present two additional claims--one against Summit County and
another against Utelite. (R. 782). The claim against Summit
County was for its abandonment of the public road upon which the
Utelite facility was built.

(R. 782-840).

The claim against

Utelite is for its interference with the Richins' right-of-way.
It is parallel to plaintiffs' nuisance claim.
In its ruling prohibiting amendment, the Trial Court denied
plaintiff's Motion on the basis that it arose three days after
the discovery cutoff, would involve third parties and would delay
the trial.

None of these reasons were sufficient under Rule 15,

U.R.C.P., to deny the amendment.
There was no surprise when the claims were made.

They had

been fully discovered by Utelite in written discovery and
depositions and the claims arose out of the same operative facts
that were the subject of the action.

See e.g., Hague v. Juab

County Mill and Elevator, 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910)
(depriving access is the basis of nuisance and interference with
egress claims).

There would have been no delay because Utelite

and the County conducted discovery on the claims.
Finally, there was and will be no need to have others,
including the Union Pacific Railroad, appear as parties.
questions do not involve ownership of property.

The

They arise out

of a well-traveled road by the public and the County accepting
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funds for maintaining the road.

(R. 945). To the extent that

the Railroad has information that bears on the issue, it can be
subpoenaed and can appear.
There was no legitimate reason to foreclose the plaintiffs
from proceeding with all of their claims.

If a retrial occurs,

the plaintiffs must be entitled to assert them and the trial
court's order denying leave to amend the third-party complaint
must be reversed.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Utelite's Motion in
Limine Precluding Evidence on the Lack of Access.

The Trial Court erroneously prohibited evidence regarding
the affect of the Utelite facility on access to plaintiff Richins
property.

The fundamental reason for the trial court's ruling

was that it had previously declined to allow the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint.

As noted, this was in error.

Further, lack of access was a basis for the pending nuisance
claim.

Hague v. Juab County Mill and Elevator, 37 Utah 290, 107

P. 249 (1910).

When the trial court limited evidence in this

respect, it would not permit evidence essential to the nuisance
claims and damages.

Therefore, the Court should reverse the

motions in limine prohibiting evidence on lack of access,
especially if it orders a retrial.
D.

The Trial Court Erred When It Allowed the Jury to View
the Facility.

The Trial Court, over the strenuous objection of the
plaintiffs, permitted the Jury to travel to watch the "operation"
of the Utelite facility.

The plaintiffs objected in advance,
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knowing that the jury view would be more prejudicial than
probative and therefore not permitted under Rule 47(j) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 2663).

See Redd v. Airway

Motor Coach Lines, 137 P.2d 374, 378-80 (Utah 1943).
The view, in fact, was not probative and was prejudicial.
It did not reflect the facility as it had been or was presently
operating.

Utelite prepared for the visit for one to two weeks

before it occurred.

(R. 2640, 2675).

It brought in a bobcat to

pick up the debris and Utelite product which normally accumulates
on the ground. (Id.).

The conditions the jury saw did not

represent those that typically existed.

(R. 2400, 2906-2907) .

The jury visit lasted less than one hour. (R. 2677).
that usually blow dust were not present.

The winds

(.Id.) .

Simply put, the jury view unfairly portrayed the facility.
It was more prejudicial than probative of past or current
conditions.

It resulted in the jury placing undue weight on its

impressions than on the testimony of witnesses.
committed error by allowing it to occur.

The Trial Court

Should there be a

retrial, the court must permit the jury to award damages that are
not impacted by an unfair representation of the Utelite
operation.
E.

The Trial Court Committed Error when it Adopted
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Prepared by
Utelite re: Equitable Relief.

Months after trial Judge Noel entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law prepared by Utelite's Counsel Re:
Relief.

Equitable

These findings did not accurately represent the evidence
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that was admitted and purportedly relied, in part, on the jury's
verdict on damages.

Neither the Court or the jury had the

benefit of all of the facts due to the prior Orders denying leave
to amend, precluding discovery, limiting evidence on access and
allowing a view of the facility that was not representative.
In addition, the Findings and Conclusions did not reflect
the evidence at trial.

The plaintiffs filed detailed objections

to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions.

(R. 2201).

The key

areas where the findings and conclusions departed from the facts
include the findings that the facility was not injurious to the
plaintiffs and does not adversely affect the plaintiffs use and
enjoyment of their property.
As set forth above with specific citations to the record,
the uncontradicted trial evidence demonstrated that dust
continues to migrate to the plaintiffs property, that dust
affects the plaintiffs health and causes them to sneeze and
cough, and the "improvements" made by Utelite are not implemented
fences remain open, Utelite is left on the ground to blow, that
truckers continued to bang on the railroad cars to clean them.
There will be no need to reverse the Trial Court on these
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law if the Court upholds
Judge Wilkinson's Order.

Should that Order be reversed, then the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law must also be reversed so
that the Trial Court can hear all of the evidence that supports
removal.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court's Order requiring the removal of the
facility is fully supported by the Development Code and Utah law.
There were no disputes of fact when that Order was entered.

This

Court should affirm this Ordei: and render an opinion that will
require the removal of the facility.

**
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Addendum A. 1

VAN COTT. BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John T. Nielsen (2408)
Attorneys for Utelite Corporation
50 South Main Street. Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Dc,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN.
RICHARD RICHINS, and
ETHEL S. RAYMOND,
Plaintiffs,
vs .
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, the SUMMIT
COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
and UTELITE CORPORATION.

DEFENDANT UTELITE
CORPORATION'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION
Civil No. 10718
Honorable Pat. B. Brian

Defendants.

The defendant Utelite Corporation through counsel,
hereby submits its responses to Plaintiffs' First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Utelite
Corporation as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Identify the individual(s)

responding to these interrogatories and the relationship to the
answering party.

RESPONSE:

Carsten N. Mortensen, Vice President,

General Manager of Utelite Corporation.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

With regard to the Utelite

Facility please state:
a.

The date construction of the Facility began;

b.

The date when the Facility was completed or
substantially completed;

c.

The purpose for which the Facility was
constructed;

d.

The date the facility began operations;

e.

The date on which Utelite Corporation
applied for a building permit;

f.

The date on which Utelite Corporation
received a building permit;

g.

The fees which were paid in connection with
the acquisition of the building permit.

RESPONSE:
a.

Ground breaking was during the last half of
February, 1989.

b.

Site was substantially completed or useable
to load cars by April 25, 1989.

c.

The Facility was constructed to load train
cars with Utelite aggregate for out of area
shipments.
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d.

The first car was loaded April 25, 1989.

e.

Utelite first applied for a building permit
on February 28, 1989.

f.

Utelite received a building permit on
February 28, 1989, Permit No. 89007.

g.

February 28, 1989, Permit No. 89007, cost
$15.00.

INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify the individual(s)

employed by Utelite Corporation who was or were responsible for
the acquisition of the building permit.
RESPONSE:

Carsten N. Mortensen.
Bruce Clark - Electric Contractor.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Identify the individual(s)

either employed by Utelite or not employed by Utelite who was
or were involved in the decision to locate the Utelite Facility
in Echo City.
RESPONSE:

Bob Barker, U.P.R.R.; Bob Jones, U.P.R.R.;

Ray Nelson, U.P.R.R.; Ray Allamong, U.P.R.R.; Mike Crouse,
U.P.R.R.; Bud Britton, U.P.R.R.; and Carsten N. Mortensen,
Utelite.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

With regard to the

individual(s) identified in Interrogatory Nos. 4 and 5,
identify each person's duties, responsibilities and/or
involvement in the decision to move the Utelite Facility to
Echo .
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RESPONSE:

Bob Barker, local sales representative in

Salt Lake City; Bob Jones, local track supervisor; Ray Nelson,
Regional Industrial Development; Ray Allamong was an U.P.R.R.
employee over contracts; Mike Crouse, unknown; Bud Britton,
believed to be a rate supervisor.

Carsten N. Mortensen, vice

president and general manager of Utelite Corporation had
various conversations and negotiations with the above named
individuals regarding various aspects of the site and loading
facility.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Identify all persons employed

by Summit County who were contacted regarding the construction
of the Utelite facility.
RESPONSE:

Jerry Smith, County Planner; all county

commissioners; Eric Averett, County Building Inspector; Bob
Taylor, County Building Inspector; Chris Schultz,
Administrative Assistant; Frank Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney; and Bob Adkins, County Attorney, Summit County
Planning Commission.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

With regard to the persons

employed by Summit County whom Utelite contacted regarding the
Utelite Facility, please state:
a.

The name of the person;

b.

The person's title or job description at
Summit County; and
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c.

The date or dates on which communications of
any sort were made with the above-identified
person or persons.

RESPONSE:

Defendant Utelite objects to c m s

interrogatory as being overly broad and

burdensome, but

notwithstanding this objection, responds only as completely as
such information is available:
1.

Jerry Smith, County Planner, November 1,
1988, and December 12-15, 1988.

2.

Eric Averett, County Building Inspector,
February 28, 1989.

3.

Bob Taylor, County Building Inspector,
October 23, 1989

4.

Chris Schultz, Administrative Assistant,
April 5, 1989 and October 26, 1989.

5.

Frank Anderson, Assistant County Attorney,
August 3, 1990.

6.

Bob Adkins, Summit County Attorney, November
10-11, 1988, January 16-17, 1989, August 22
and 24, 1989, October 8 and 31, 1989, and
November 27, 1989.

7.

County Commissioners, February 1, 1989,
April 5, 1989 and January 17, 1990.

8.

Summit County Planning Commission, December
13, 1988.
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In responding to this interrogatory, it is impossible
to determine who contacted the Commissioners or what precisely
was communicated.

These responses have been reconstructed from

all available information.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Identify all individuals

employed by Summit County who contacted Utelite Corporation
regarding the Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 7.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

With regard to the persons

employed by Summit County who contacted Utelite Corporation
regarding the Utelite Facility, please state:
a.

The date on which such communication or
communications occurred;

b.

The type of communication (e.g.) telephone,
letter, personal communication;

c.

The substance of each and every
communication regardless of type; and

d.

The person at Utelite Corporation to whom
such communication was made.

RESPONSE:

Communication was made by most of the

county representatives mentioned in Interrogatory No. 6 above.
Dates and particulars of these communications are uncertain but
have been answered as fully as possible in Response to
Interrogatory No. 7 above and subject to the same objection as
set forth therein.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

Identify all persons employed

by Utelite Corporation who have contacted Summit County
officials regarding the construction of the Utelite Facility in
Echo.

With respect to each such person, state:
a.

With what official at Summit County the
contact was made;

b.

The date or datss of all such communications;

c.

The substance of each communication; and

d.

Identify all documents reflecting or
pertaining Co any such communication.

RESPONSE:

Carsten N. Mortensen made communication to

the individuals identified in its Response to Interrogatory No.
6 above and as best as can be reconstructed on the dates listed
in its Response to Interrogatory No. 7.

The substance of such

communication related to approval, permitting and construction
of the facility.

Documents reflecting these contacts include

building permit applications dated February 28, 1989, November
28, 1989, and October 23, 1990 and a letter from the Summit
County Planning Commission dated January 13, 1989.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

To the best of your knowledge,

identify all persons not employed by Utelite Corporation who
h<ive contacted Summit County official on behalf of Utelite
Corporation regarding the construction of the Utelite Facility
in Echo.

With respect to each such person, state (a) with what
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official at Summit County the contact was made; (b) the date or
dates of all such communications; (c) the substance of each
communication; and (d) identify all documents reflecting or
pertaining to any such communication.
RESPONSE:

Utelite objects to this interrogatory on

the basis that they are without sufficient knowledge to
respond, although it is possible that Union Pacific Railroad
personnel may have had some contact with Summit County.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

Identify all persons employed

by Utelite Corporation, or persons contacted on behalf of
Utelite Corporation which officials from Summit County have
contacted regarding the Utelite Facility in Echo.
to each state:

With respect

(a) the name of the Summit County official who

made the contact; (b) the person with whom the Summit County
official made contact; (c) the date or dates of all such
communications; (d) the substance of each communication; and
(e) identify all documents reflecting or pertaining to any such
communication.
RESPONSE:

Other than Carsten Mortensen, only Utelite

attorneys Mike Keller and John T. Nielsen have had contact with
Summit County regarding the Utelite Facility in Echo.

Such

conversations have been with Summit County attorneys respecting
the defense of this matter and thus privileged.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Did Utelite Corporation

receive verbal or written permission to begin the construction
of the Utelite Facility prior to the time Utelite received a
building permit.
RESPONSE:

Yes.

INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

If the answer to Interrogatory

No. 13 is yes, please state (a) the date on which permission
was granted; (b) the person or persons who gave permission; (c)
the manner in which such permission was given; (d) identify all
documents which refer, reflect or relate to the granting of
permission.
RESPONSE:
a.

January 13, 1989.

b.

Summit County Planning Commission, Robert
McGregor, Chairman.

c.

Verbally in meeting on December 13, 1988 and
in a letter dated January 13, 1989.

d.

Letter of January 13, 1989 from the Summit
County Planning Commission.

INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

On what date did Utelite

Corporation first consider moving the Utelite Facility to Echo.
RESPONSE:

Summer of Fall of 1988.

INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

On what date did Utelite

Corporation make its final decision to move the Utelite
facility to Echo.
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RESPONSE:

Fall of 1988.

INTERROGATORY NO. 17:

Please state with

particularity each fact which led to the moving of the Utelite
Facility in Echo.
RESPONSE:

Utelite was informed as early as 1986 of

the possibility that U.P.R.R. would abandon the railroad spur
to Park City.

It was hoped that even if the spur was

abandoned, it would only be above the Utelite Facility at
milepost 13.5.

When the railroad told Utelite of their intent

to abandon on May 19, 1988, several options were considered
depending upon the extent of the abandonment as follows:
1.

Move to a larger facility at Phoston;

2.

Improve the facility at Wanship and abandon
above MP 13.5.

3.

Move to Coalville and abandon above
Coalville;

4.

Move to the abandoned Gas Plant site north
of Coalville and abandon above that area;

5.

Move the facility to North Salt Lake; and

6.

Move to Echo.

INTERROGATORY NO. 18:

Please state with

particularity each fact that led to the final decision to
locate the Utelite Facility in Echo.
RESPONSE:

Options 1 through 4 were ruled out because

of the extent of the abandonment of the railroad.
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5.

Economics because of the haul distance and
discouragement by the U.P.R.R. ruled out
option number 5.

6.

The U.P.R.R. suggested the Echo option
which, after considering the alternatives,
all agreed would be the best site.

INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

What was determined to be the

advantages to Utelite Corporation of having the Utelite
Facility at its present location.
RESPONSE:

The closest location to the plant at an

established railroad yard and siding.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

Did Utelite consider other

locations for the Utelite Facility?
RESPONSE:

See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and

18.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

Identify each and every

location which was considered for the construction of the
Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:

See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and

18.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Please state with

particularity each fact which led Utelite to not locate its
loadout facility in the other locations considered.
RESPONSE:

See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and

18.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

What consideration was given

to other locations for the construction of the Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:

See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 17 and

18.
INTERROGATORY NO., 24:

What were the determinative

factors in Utelite's decision to build the Utelite Facility in
Echo rather than other locations.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 18.

Additionally, this was the preferred location of the Railroad.
INTERROGATORY NO. 25:

At any time since the

beginning of construction of the Utelite Facility has Utelite
Corporation reevaluated or reconsidered its decision to locate
the facility in Echo.

If so state:

a.

The date of each such re-evaluation;

b.

The name of the person or persons making
that re-evaluation on each such date;

c.

What was Utelite's decision regarding its
evaluation or the present Utelite Facility
site .

RESPONSE:

No.

INTERROGATORY NO. 26:

What, if any, communications

regarding the Utelite Facility were made by Utelite Corporation
to the citizens of Echo who lived in close proximity to the
Utelite Facility.

With regard to any such communication, state:
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a.

The person or persons to whom such
communications were made;

b.

The date on which such communications were
made;

c.

The form of or manner in which such
communications were made; and

d.
RESPONSE:

The substance of any such communication.
Plaintiff Frank Cattelan was the first

person from Echo contacted in the fall of 1988, and from the
beginning had a few suggestions such as building approvals,
etc.

Cattelan never voiced objections until after Utelite had

loaded our first few cars, when he complained of a dust
problem.

In the same time period, Utelite had contact with

Richard Richins.

He expressed concerns about moving the road.

Pete Clark was communicated with during .the early
phases of the project.

He was concerned that people or animals

might be caught in the "grizzly."

The facility has since been

fenced.
Richard and Jane Harper have expressed concerns about
dust.

It is unknown when such communications were had.
Utelite contends that all such concerns have been

addressed and that Utelite has moved expeditiously and
effectively to respond to citizen concerns.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 27:

What, do you contend, is the

zoning classification of the area occupied by the Utelite
Facility?
RESPONSE:

Utelite objects to this interrogatory as

not being directed to the party most able to answer.

Utelite

has relied upon the determination of Summit County that the
facility is a "permitted use" at that location and contends
that such a determination correctly characterizes Utelite's
right to maintain and continue the use of the facility.
INTERROGATORY NO. 28:

What, do you contend, was the

zoning classification of the area occupied by the Utelite
facility when construction of the Utelite facility began?
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 27.

INTERROGATORY NO. 29:

What, do you contend, was the

zoning classification of the area occupied by the Utelite
facility on the day the building permit was issued?
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 27.

INTERROGATORY NO. 29:

Did Utelite Corporation obtain

a certificate of Zoning Compliance from Summit County.

If so,

state the date on which such certificate was issued.
RESPONSE:

Utelite received a letter dated January

13, 1989 indicating that the Utelite operation "would be a
permitted use at the Echo site."
INTERROGATORY NO. 30:

With regard to Interrogatory

Nos. 27, 28 and 29, please state with particularity the basis
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upon which you claim such zoning classification exists
presently or existed at the time construction of the Utelite
Facility began or when the building permit was issued.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 27.

INTERROGATORY NO. 31:

State the name and current

employer of the person employed by Utelite Corporation at the
time when the planning and construction of the Utelite Facility
in Echo was begun who you believe was the most knowledgeable of
your employees regarding the decision to move the Utelite
Facility to its present
RESPONSE:

location.

Carsten N. Mortensen, vice president,

general manager.
INTERROGATORY NO. 32:

State the name and current

employer of the person employed by Utelite Corporation at the
time the planning and construction of the Utelite facility in
Echo was begun who you believe had the most contact with
officials from Summit County.
RESPONSE:

Carsten N. Mortensen.

INTERROGATORY NO. 33:

Describe in detail the process

and procedures which Utelite Corporation went through in
obtaining approval or permission by Summit County to locate and
construct the Utelite Facility at its present location.
RESPONSE:

Following the railroad's decision

respecting relocation and site choice, Carsten N. Mortensen

-15-

contacted Jerry Smith of Summit County Planning respecting the
site.

Smith indicated that he saw no problem but suggested

that the matter be reviewed by the Planning Commission.
Mortensen went before the Planning Commission on December 13,
1988 and received a letter dated January 13, 1989 indicating
that the facility would be a ''permitted use" at the Echo site.
INTERROGATORY NO. 34:

What was the amount of the

projected costs to construct the Utelite Facility in Echo.
RESPONSE:

Around $70,000.00

INTERROGATORY NO. 35:

What was the total cost of

construction of the Utelite Facility in Echo.
RESPONSE:

Around $120,000.00

INTERROGATORY NO. 36:

On what date, if any, did

Utelite file with Summit County a detailed site plan drawn to
scale as part of the application for a building permit.
RESPONSE:

It is believed to be when Carsten N.

Mortensen met before the Planning Commission and when he
applied for a building permit.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1:

All documents in your possession or

under your control which were relied on, referred to or
identified in your responses to the foregoing interrogatories.
RESPONSE:

The only documents identified are the

letters from the Summit County Planning Commission dated

-16-

January 13, 1989 and the Building Permit Applications.

These

documents are produced with this response.
REQUEST NO. 2:

All documents addressing or

discussing the Utelite Facility located in Echo.

This request

includes, but is not limited to, correspondence between Utelite
and officials of Summit County, documents discussing the
decision to move the Utelite Facility to its present location,
documents regarding and including the request and application
for a building permit to build the Utelite Facility, documents
relating to the fees required or not required for the building
permit and all other internally generated or externally
generated documents which refer, reflect, or relate to the
Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:

Utelite has entered into certain

agreements with Union Pacific Railroad for use of the property
at Echo rail yard.

These agreements contain information,

financial and otherwise, which is confidential and has no
bearing on the subject matter of this lawsuit and for this
reason the same are not produced.

The Approval Order from the

Bureau of Air Quality is produced herewith.
REQUEST NO. 3:

Please produce any and all documents

which refer, reflect, or relate to each and every communication
received by Utelite or of which Utelite is aware that discuss,
mention, or touch upon Summit County's approval of the Utelite
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Facility or of Summit County's granting of a building permit
for the Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Request No. 1 above,.

REQUEST NO. 4:

Please produce the entire application

for the building permit for the Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Request No. 1.

Documents

are produced herewith.
REQUEST NO. 5:

Please produce the certificate of

zoning compliance which Utelite received as part of the
application procedure.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Request No. 1.

REQUEST NO. 6:

Please produce the building permit

for the Utelite Facility.
RESPONSE:
herewith.

A copy of Permit No. 89201 is produced

Permit No. 89007 issued February 28, 1989 is not

available.
REQUEST NO. 7:

Please produce all documents

evidencing the fees which were paid to Summit County by Utelite
Corporation in connection with the construction of the Utelite
Facility including, but not limited to building permit fees and
investigation fees.
RESPONSE:

The only fees paid so far as are known are

those required with the building permit application.
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Said

applications, produced herewith, show amount of fees actually
paid.
DATED this ]Jj_ day of December, 1990.

As to Objections:
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
By
John\T.
n \ 1. Nielsen
Nielsen
\
Att(orneys for Utelite Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. n0// Box
n ~ „ 45340
/. Q -\ /. n
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
UTELITE CORPORATION

'Carsten N. -ffortensen
Vice President
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On December

)
:

ss.

)
, 1990, appeared before me Carsten N.

Mortensen, Vice President for the defendant Utelite Corporation
who duly acknowledged under oath that he is the signer of the
foregoing Defendant Utelite Corporation's Response to
Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production, that he is duly authorized by the defendant to sign
said responses, and that the information set forth therein is
true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Res idmg at :
NOTARY PUBLIC
LUDMILAGRYGAR
S*flLA«©CKY U t t - M 1 1 t

iftetftn**' is. iwa
STATE OF UTAH

5280N( 10)
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Addendum A. 3

The
Dewtopment
Code
of

Prepared for the purpose of guiding
the growth of Summit County
in harmony with its rich heritage,
serene environment
and exciting future!

(42) Mobile Home Lot
A designated site within a mobile home p*rk for
the exclusive use of the occupants of a single mobile home.
(49) Mobile Home fork An area or tract of land of at least three (5)
acres used to accommodate two (2) or more mobile homes and which remains
in single ownership.
(50) Mobile Home Subdivision
A subdivision of at least three (5) acres
which is reserved for the placement of mobile homes and not other types of
dwelling units.
(51) fen-conforming Building or Structure
A building or structure or
portion thereof, lawfully existing at the time this Code became effective,
which does not conform to all height, area, and yard regulations of the
zone in which it is located.
(52) Nonconforming; Use
A use which lawfully occupied a building or land
at the time this Code became effective and which does not conform with the
use regulations of the zone in which it is located.
(55) Permitted Use
required.

A use of land for which no conditional use permit is

(54) Rest Home (Nursing Home)
A heme for the aged, chronically ill, or
incurable persons in which three (3) or more persons not of the immediate
family ^re received, kept, or provided with food and shelter or care for
compensation; but not including hospitals, clinics, or similar institutions devoted primarily to the diagnosis and treatment of the sick or
injured.
(55) Recreation Vehicle
Any trailer house, camper, van or similar
vehicle used or maintained primarily as a temporary dwelling for travel,
vacation, or recreation purposes and having a width of nine (9) feet or
less or a length of 35 feet or less.
(56) Recreation Vehicle Park
Recreational Vehicle Park shall mean an
area or tract of land used to accommodate two (2) or more travel trailers,
vacation vehicles, or caliper units for a short period of tine (less than
30 days.)
(56) Sanitary Landfill
An area designated for the disposing of refuse
on land without creating nuisances or hazards to public health or safety,
by utilizing the principles of engineering to confine the refuse to the
smallest practical area, to reduce it to the smallest practical volume,
and to cover it with a layer of earth at the conclusions of operation or
at more frequent intervals as may be necessary.
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(57) Substantial Improvement Any repair, reconstruction, or improvement
of a structure, the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent of the
market value of the structure either:
(1) before the improvement or repair is started, or
(2) if the structure has been damaged and is being restored, before
the damage occurred. For the purpose of this definition "Substantial
improvement" is considered to occur when the first alteration of any
wall, ceiling, floor, or other structural part of the building
commences, whether or not that alteration affects the external
dimensions of the structure. The term does not, however, include
either;
(1) any project for inprovement of a structure to conply with existing
state or local health, sanitary, or safety code specifications which
are solely necessary to assure safe living conditions, or
(2) any alteration of a structure listed on the National Register or
Historic Places or a State Inventory of Historic Places.
(58) Setback
A front, rear, or side setback shall be the minimum
horizontal distance between the lot line and building or structure.
(59) Story
That portion of a building included between the surface of a
floor and the ceiling next above it.
(60) Street
to property.

Any right-of-way serving as the principal means of access

(61) Structure
Anything constructed or erected which requires location
on the ground or attached to something having location on the ground.
(62) Subdivision
The term "subdivision" means the division of a tract
or lot or parcel of land into three or more lots, plats, sites, or other
divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or
of building development; provided that this definition shall not include a
bonafide division or partition of agricultural land for agricultural
purposes, or of commercial, manufacturing, or industrial land for
corrHTErcial manufacturing, or industrial purposes. For the purpose of this
Code, the division of land into three (3) or more lots less than 20 acrea
in size by the same individual or party over any 12 year period shall be
presumed to be for sale or for building development.
(63) Use, Accessory
A subordinate use customarily incidental to and
located upon the same lot occupied by the main use and devoted exclusively
to the main use of the premises.

l-f> ( a \

Construction or removal of any building or structure or any part thereof as
provided or as restricted in this Code shall not be commenced, or proceeded
with, except after the issuance of a written permit for the same by the county
building inspector. Provided, however, construction that does not increase the
enclosed floor space of the building shall be exempt from the requirement of
a building permit. Prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit sh?ll be
..u~ ~ u # . - : . » • . * - ^c
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filed as part of any application prior to consideration for any building permit.
The site plan shall show where pertinent:
C D Note of scale used,
C2) Direction of North point,
(3) Lot lines together with adjacent streets, roads} setbacks^_and
rights-of-way.
(4T~Location of all existing structures on subject property and
adjoining properties (completely dimensioned, including utility
lines, poles, e t c ) ,
C5) Location of the proposed construction and improvements, including
the location of all signs.
(6) Motor vehicle access, including individual parking stalls, circulation patterns, curb, gutter, and sidewalk location.
(7) Necessary explanatory notes,
CB) Nat^e, address, and telephone number of builder and owner.
09) All other information that may be required as determined by the
building inspector,
1,10 Fire District Review of Building Plans
Where buildings are to be used for industrial, commercial, or commercial/
residential Cfourplex or larger) purposes, building and sitQ plans must be
submitted for approval of the local fire protection district prior to the
issuance of the building permit. In the case of disputes over fire district
r qui ements
?
Y
» t h e fioerd of County Commissioners will make the final determination as to the requirements after consultation with the interested parties.
1

- 1 1 Fire Protection Facilities to be Installed Prior to Issuance of
Building Permits

In?subdivisions, commercial and industrial parks, planned unit developments,
ana^condominium projects requiring the installation of water systems and
storage capacity for fire protection under Chapter 13 of this Code, building
permitslwill not be issued until facilities serving the construction sites
are .completely installed and operational, or alternatively, upon the approval
'of the .local fire protection district, .temporary facilities provided. In the
case-af',di«pute»"over fire district requirements, the Board of County Commissioner* will make final determination as to the requirements after consultation
witn the interested parties.
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1.12 Water Required for Building Permit
A source of water must be provided prior to the issuance of a building permit
for a dwelling. If the dwelling is to be served by an existing water system
the building permit application must be accompanied by a statement from a
representative of the system indicating that the water hook-up will be allowed
and that the system can deliver adequate quality/ quantity, and pressure
to the proposed dwelling.
If a private source of water is to be developed that building permit application
must be accompanied by evidence of water rights or ownership of the proposed
source or supply, application numbers from filings with the State Divis^cr.
of Water Resources, and evidence that the source can be adequately isolated
from all present and potential sources of pollution in accordance with State
standards.
1.13 Address Required for Building Permit
An address in conformance with the Summit County Addressing System must be
assigned before issuance of a building permit. All addressess shall be
assigned and/or approved by the County Planning Office.
1.14 Issuance of Building Permits Prior to Completion and Acceptance of
Required Improvements
Building permits may be issued for construction in subdivisions and other
projects prior to the completion and acceptance by the County of the required
property improvements. In such cases, the County Building Inspector may require that the applicant for a building permit sign a statement indicating
the following:
(1) That the applicant is aware of the terms of the bond or escrow
account established to guarantee completion of required improvements
to the satisfaction of the County.
(2) That the applicant releases Summit County from liability for installation, maintenance, or repair of the required improvements until
the same have been completed and accepted by the County.
(3) That the applicant assumes all risk in connection with construction
on the subject property.
1.15 Enforcement
All departments, officials, and public employees of Summit County vested
with the duty and authority to issue permits, licenses, or certificates of
zoning compliance shall conform to the provisions of this Code and shall
not issue a permit, license, or certificate of zoning compliance for use,
building, or other purposes where the same would be in conflict with this
Code, and any such permit, license, or certificate issued in conflict with
the provisions of this Code, shall be null and void.
The Building Inspector and Zoning Administrator are charged with enforcement of this Code and are authorized either personally or through a duly
authorized representative, to inspect or cause to be inspected all building
and structures in the course of construction, modification, or repair and
to inspect land uses to determine compliance with this Code.
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1.16 Penalties
Any person, firm, or corporation, whether as principal, agent,
employee, or otherwise, violating or causing the violation
of any of the provisions of this Code shall be guilty or a
misdemeanor and punishable as provided by law. The County
Attorney, or any owner of real estate adversely affected by
a violation of this Code, may institute injuntion, abatement,
or any other appropriate legal action to prevent, enjoin, abate,
or remove any erection, construction, alteration, maintenance,
or use in violation of this Code.
1.17 Time
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this
Code, the day of the act, event, or decisions from which the
designated period of times begins to run is not included. The
last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next day which is not
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. Intermediate
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays shall be included in the
computation. The date of a decision shall be the date of the
hearing or the date the decision or recommendation is made.
If no hearing is held on the matter, the date of decision
or recommendation shall be the date written notice of such
decision or recommendation is mailed to the applicant.
1.18 County Planning Commission
The Summit County Planning Commission shall operate pursuant
to 17-27-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. All members
of the Summit County Planning Commission shall reside and own
real property in Summit County and a majority of said commission shall reside in the unincorporated areas of the county.

NONCONFORMING BUILDINGS AND USES

3.1

Maintenance Permitted

A nonconforming building or structure may be maintained and the occupancy
of such building or structure may be continued.
3.2

Repairs and Alterations
•*•

Repairs and structural alterations may be made to a nonconforming building
or to a building housing a nonconforming use.
3.3

Restoration of Damaged Buildings

A nonconforming building or structure and a building or structure occupied
by a nonconforming use which is damaged or destroyed by fire, flood, or
other calamity or act of nature may be restored, and the building or structure
or use of such building, structure, or part thereof may be continued or
resumed, provided that such restoration is started within a period of one
year from the date of destruction and is diligently prosecuted to completion.
Such restoration shall not increase the floor space devoted to the nonconforming use over that which existed at the time the building became nonconforming.
3-4

Discontinuance or Abandonment

A nonconforming building or structure or portion thereof or a lot occupied
by a nonconforming use which is, or which hereafter becomes abandoned or
which is discontinued for a continuous period of one year or more shall
not thereafter be occupied, except by a use which conforms to the regulations
of the zone in which it is located.
3.5

Change of Use

The nonconforming use of a building or structure may not be changed
except to a conforming use; but where such change is made, the use shall not
thereafter be changed back to a nonconforming use.
3.6

Expansion of Use Permitted

A nonconforming use may be extended to include the entire floor area of the
existing building in which it is conducted at the time the use became
nonconforming.
3.7

Nonconforming Use of Land

The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this Code became
effective, may be continued, provided that no such nonconforming use of
land shall in any way be expanded or extended either on the same or adjoining property, and provided that if such nonconforming use of land, or any
portion thereof, is abandoned or changed tor a period of one (1) year or more,
any future use of such land shall be in conformity with the provisions of
this Code.
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3.8

Non-Conforming Size of Lots

Any lot of record at the time of passage of this Code in any zone in which
single tamily dwellings are permitted and which does not comply with the
standards of this Code with regard to lot area may be used for a single family
dwelling, excluding mobile homes unless the lot is at least one acre in size.
A lot of record shall consist of a lot shown on a recorded subdivision plat
or described in a recorded metes and bounds description as a deed, sales contract, or survey. In the event the lot was not recorded prior to the adoption
of this Code, the Board of Adjustment shall determine whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to deem that the lot existed prior to the date of the passage of this Code.
3.9

Abandonment

A non-conforming use shall be deemed abandoned if said use has not applied to
the premises for a consecutive period of 12 months.
3.10 Permits Granted Prior to Passage of Code.
Authorization granted by the county to construct a building or structure
shall not be denied or abridged in the event that a building permit has
been issued and such permit is still valid.
3-11 Subdivision Approved Prior to Passage of Code
A subdivision which had received preliminary approval from the Planning
Commission prior to the adoption of this Code shall be allowed in any zone,
irrespective of zone requirements for lot size, if the requirements for
final approval in accordance with Summit County Ordinance No. 65 have been
met and the plat approved within fifteen (15) months of the adoption of this
Code.
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boundary l o c a t i o n , the Planning Corrmission s h a l l i n t e r p r e t t h e map.
5

Suburban r e s i d e n t i a l zone

(SR-1)

(i) Purpose. Tl>e SR-1 zone is tistabliahed to provide ievidential
developments on relatively flat terrain and in close proximity to service
delivery centers or developments already receiving county services.
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by clustered residences
on flat terrain and on the most suitable soils for development purposes.
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19
(4) Authorized Uses.

See Section 12.20

(5) Special Provisions.
6

Rural Residential Zone

None
(RR-1)

(1) Purpose. The RR-1 zone is established to provide a location where
residential development associated with country living and open space can
be maintained in conpatability with the natural constraints of the land.
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by uneven terrain with
dwellings clustered in swells or valleys and/or placed on large lots on
the steeper slopes.
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19
(4) Authorized Uses.

7

See Section 12.20

(5) Special Provision.

None

Rural Residential Zone

(RR-2)

(1) Purpose. The RR-2 zone is established to provide residential
development in a rural setting without conflicting with agriculture.
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by dwelling lots along
public highways interspersed with agriculture land and associated buildings.
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Section 12.19
(4) Authorized Uses.

See Section 12.20

(5) Special Provisions.
(a) This zone extended for 500 feet on either side of the center line
of maintained public roadways which are designated on the Summit County
zoning map. Residential dwellings are permitted on lots which have
frontage along the indicated roadways. At least the required frontage
width shall be maintained between side lot lines from the front property
line to the front building setback. Cherry stem or other irregular
shapped lots are prohibited.
(b) Duplexes are allowed upon the issuance of a conditional use permit
with a minimum lot size of 3/4 of an acre, at least 165 feet of frontaqfon a maintained public roadway as designated on the Surrmit County zonirq
map, limited to only one (1) access point; and submittal of a site pla:.
to be approved by the Planning Commission.

12.18 ( E ) Snyderville B a s i n - D i s t r i c t - SBD-1
(1) Purpose. The SBD-1 zoning d i s t r i c t i s designed as a single "Code"
c o n s i s t i n g of planning p o l i c i e s and development r e g u l a t i o n s wherein
development proposals a r e considered on t h e i r individual m e r i t s . As with
other approaches to planning zoning t h i s zone promotes the public h e a l t h ,
safety and welfare by maximizing the positive impacts of development and
minimizing the negative.
(2) C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . This zone i s characterized by an innovative approach
t o planning and development approvals in t h a t a permit to develop i s
granted or denied on the b a s i s of a proposals conpliance with p r e - s e t
performance standards ( p o l i c i e s ) covering a wide range of s o c i a l , economic,
environmental, design and public f a c i l i t i e s f a c t o r s . Processing and f i n a l
decision on a development a p p l i c a t i o n focus on the developers
"evidentiary package" which c o n s i s t s of: an a p p l i c a t i o n form, plans,
drawings and rendering, and one-page evidentiary forms for each policy, and
conpleted by the developer.
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Snyderville Basin
Development Code Chapter 5 , Policy, Section 5.6 Absolute P o l i c i e s , Section
5.7 Relative P o l i c i e s , Section 5.9 Density, and Table 6.
(4) Authorized Uses. See the Snyderville Basin Development Code Chapter 5 f
P o l i c y , Section 5.6, Section 5 . 7 .
(5) Special Provisions.
(a) Permits required. A Class I or Class I I development permit i s
required for a l l developments in the Sndyerville Basin Zoning D i s t r i c t .
(b) Lot s i z e , frontage width, front, side & rear setbacks and
authorized uses. Due to the uniqueness of t h i s development approva 1
process, requirements for Section 12.19 and 12.20 w i l l be obtained
from the standards contained in Chapter 5 and Table 6 of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code.
12.19

Lot Requirements for Building Purpose.

Refer to table of page 12-8 b , c .

12.20 Authorized Uses in Zones. In the following table permitted uses of
lands or building a r e indicated by a "P", conditional uses of lands or
buildings are indicated by a "C", and if the use i s not allowed i t i s e i t h e r
not named in the use l i s t or i t i s indicated by a "_". See authorized use table
on page 1 2 . 9 .
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Authorized Uses

^1/

Accosi-ory buildings ana" uses customarily
incidental to permitted and traditional
uses •

(2)

Agriculture

SK-1

RR-1

RR-2

R-l

R-5

AC-1

WR-1

WF-I

C-l

(.R-l

HS-1

LI -1

A. The raising, cultivating, grazing,
or breeding of plants or animals in
unlimited quantities.
B. Animals and fowl for recreation
or for family food production for the
primary use of persons residing on
the premises.
C. Agriculture industries or businesses involving agricultural production in manufacturing, packaging,
treatment, sales, intensive feeding,
or storage, including animal feed
yard-;, kennels, fur farms, food
packaging or processing plants,
commercial greenhouses, commercial
poultry or egg production, saw mills,
and similar uses.
(3)

Dwellings
A. Single Family Dwellings

P

P

P

P

B. Two Family Dwellings

C

C

C

c

C. Multiple Family Dwellings in
Planned Unit Developments

P

D. Multiple unit dwellings for
commercial purposes, i.e., motels,
hotels, condominiraums, and boarding
houses, providing that the density
of units with kitchen facilities shall
not exceed ten (10) per acre and units

p
P
p

c

p

RR-2
R-l
R-5
-

AG-1
-

WR-1
-

SR-1
-

RR-1

E. Multiple unit dwellings for commercial purposes, i.e., hotels, motels,
and condominiums, with no density requirements, provided however that at
least seventy (70) percent of the project, excluding parking space and road
rights-of-way, is maintained as natural
or landscaped open space or outdoor
recreation facilities, i.e., swimming
pools, tennis courts, etc.

-

-

F. Mobile Homes on one acre minimum lots
(but in no case less than the minimum lot
b u e required in the zone) and subject to
requirements of Chapter 10.

-

P

P

P

P

G. Mobile homes for housing agricultural employees and subject to
the requirements of Chapter 10.

-

-

C

-

-

II. Mobile home parks and subdivisions
btibject to requirements of Chapter 10.

C

C

c

c

-

-

-

-

I. Recreation vehicle parks subject
to requirements of Chapter 9.

-

-

c

c

c

c

c

c

witnouL kitenen facilities, thirty ( 3 0
per acre, unless it can be shown that
adequate fire protection is provided
to safeguard human life to justify a
greater height than permitted in Section
5.6 of this Code; in such cases densities
may be increased, provided however that
the density shall not exceed the above
described densities for each two building
levels above fire fighting grade.

)

WF-1

C-l
p

CR-1
p

HS-1
p

LI
_

P
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P

C

P

C

P

-

-

-

-

C

-

-

-

C

-

-

c

-

c - c c

SR-1

RR-i

RR-2
"

J. Farm or ranch housing for employees
of the farm or ranch.
(•*)

Outdoor Connie rcial recreation activities including archery and rifle ranges,
campgrounds, golf courses, dude ranches,
public stables, ski lifts, public snowmobile trails, and other similar uses,
C

C

"

R-l
""

C

-

c

c

R-5
III

•

»••

-

AC-1

in

. n

p

c

•

WR-1
li

•

ii •

• • •

7-1
»

it

p

c

C-i

•

, i

)

c

c

Clt-i
•

'

c

—•

-

c

HS-1
•

.in

-

-

c

c

(i>) Saleb Activities
A. Retail establishments such as
grocery and general merchandise stores
and novelty, gift, and photo supply
stores.

-

-

15. Service establishments, including
barber shops, confectionary shops,
laundromats and dry cleaners, indoor
recreation centers, mortuary, home
appliance repair shops, banks, and
other similar commerce.

-

-

C. Travel service and entertainment
establishments such as automobile
service stations, restaurants, drivein food stands, and theatres.

-

-

D. Office buildings, including clinics,
animal hospitals, and other office
activities,

C

c

C

-

E. Liquor and beer sales and places
for the drinking of liquor and beer.

-

-

-

-

F. Neighborhood convenience stores
for the primary use of the residents
in the immediate vicinity.

C

C

C

C

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

P

P

P

P

p

p

p

p

p

p

C

C

I

'

-

r

p

p

p

-

-

-

P

P

P

P

LI-1
'

——

-

SR-1
(6)

RR-1

RR-2

A. Home occupations conducted entirely
within a dwelling by one or more persons
residing within a dwelling not to include
however the sale of commodities except
those which are produced on the premises
and involve the use of any accessory
buildings or yard space. Qualifying home
occupations include the use of the
home by a physician, surgeon, dentist,
or physical therapist for emergency
consultation or treatment or for the use
of a lawyer, engineer, or other professional person for consultation and for
auxiliary use; the occupation of an
artist who gives private lessons in voice,
dance, boxing, piano or other musical
instrument limited to a maximum of eight
(S) pupils at a time; a foster home or
child care center for not more than eight
(8) children at a time; the renting of
one or more rooms to not more than four
(4) persons provided that one additional
space of off-street parking be provided
for each two renting persons.
P

P

P

P

p

p

p

B. Home occupations involving the use
of yard space or accessory buildings and
including the sale of commodities not produced on the premises, provided however
that such occupation shall not be detrimental to adjacent property owners. Such
occupation shall be subject to annual
issuance and annual reissuance of home
occupation permits by the Hoard of Commissioners. Such home occupations include
ho:nc appliance repairs, carpentry, and
the raising of animals for other than
lan-.ily use or consumption.
C

C

^

C

C

C

C

R-l

R-5

AG-1

WR-1

WF-1

C-l

CR-i

!IS-1

p

p

p

p

p

C

P

P

P

P

Home Occupations
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LI-l

SR-1

RK-1 R R - 2 R - l

R-5

A G - 1 WR-1 WF-1 C -

(7) r i i v a t e Service Activities
A.

Child day care or nursery

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

-

P

B.
Private educational i n s t i t u t i o n
having a curriculum similar to public
schools and approved by the s t a t e .

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

P

C. Private i n s t i t u t i o n or organization
recreational grounds and f a c i l i t i e s , not
open to the general public and to which
no admission charge i s made.

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

I).

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

C

C

C

C

P

C

C

C

C

P

A. Power generation plants, dams and
reservoirs, transmitting stations and
substations, and television satallite
stations.

C

C

C

C

C

P

P

C

C

B.
Hospitals, medical c l i n i c s , cemet e r i e s , and churches.

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

P

C.

Public buildings

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

-

P

D.

Parks

P

P

P

P

P

P

P

C

P

-

-

C

C

C

P

P

C

-

Rest or convalescent homes

£.
Piivate parks, recreational grounds
recreational camps or r e s o r t s , including
accessory or supporting dwellings or
dwelling complexes and conuiiercial service
uses which are owned or managed by the
lecreational f a c i l i t y to which they are
accessory.
(d) Public or Quasi Public Service Activities

{<*) Processing and Manufacturing
/v. Quarries, gravel pits, open pit
mines, and tunnel mines.
B.

Oil wells, natural gas wells,

r-ist>*'
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SR-1

RR-1RR-

C. Rock crushers, concrete batching
plants, asphalt plants, and petroleum
refineries.

-

-

-

D. Manufacturing, curing, compounding,
processing, packaging, and treatment of
bakery goods, candy, cereal, pharmaceuticals, toiletries, cosmetics,
sporting goods, and other goods which
will be manufactured by non-polluting
methods.

-

-

-

E. Uses which because of their incompatibility with domestic activities
are required to be located at least
300 feet from a zone boundary including
foundary, casting of lightweight nonferrous metals, blast furnaces, and
similar uses. Such uses shall not
exceed state or federal environment
protection standards.

-

-

-

F. Manufacturing, processing, refining,
treatment, distilling, storage, compounding or pipeline transmission
of acid, amonia, acetylene gas, disinfectants, plastics, pot ash, and
other such materials.
-

-

G. Processing, treatment, stabilization
or storage of liquid or solid wastes
except agricultural wastes, i.e.;
garbage, rubbish, trash and other
refuse material, sewer sludge, raw
sewage, oil or gas well drilling
fluids, etc.

R-l

R-5

AG-1

WR-1

WF-1

C-l

CR-1

HS-1

-

-

C

C

C

-

-

-

P

-

-

-

C

C

-

-

-

-

P

c

C

C

C

C

C

-

-

C

p

p

C

-

H. Pipeline transmission of petroleum and natural gas.

P

P

P

p

p

I. Welding and blacksmith shops,
and auto-body repair shops.

-

-

-

-

-

T>-14

c

-

-

p

p

p

p

P

-

C

P

LI-1

SR-1
(10) Signs subject to Chapter 8

P

RR-1
P

RR-2
P

R-l
P

R-5
P

AG-1

P

WR-1

P

WF-1

-

.

*

•: L

CR-1

HS-1

P

P

3,1-1
P

(11) Transportation
A.

Bus terminal

B.

Freighting or trucking yard

or terminal.
C.

Airport

D.

Truck stop and service facilities

(12) Storage and Warehousing
A. Coal and fuel yards including but
not limited to firewood, heating oil,
propane, butane and kerosene.
B. Contractors equipment storage
,ard and plant.

-

-

C

-

-

-

-

-

-

P

C

C

P

-

-

-

-

-

-

P

-

C

P

C

C

C

-

-

-

-

-

-

P

-

P

P

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

C

P

C

-

-

C

C

C

-

-

-

-

-

-

C

-

C

P

C

C

C

C

-

-

-

C

C

_

_

P

C.

Garage, public

-

-

-

C

C

-

-

-

-

C

D.

Junk yard

-

-

-

-

-

C

P

-

-

P

E.

Warehouse

C

P

C

C

-

-

P

-

P

P

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

P

P

P

-

-

-

P

P

P

P

F. Rental storage sheds
(13) Planned Unit Development subject to
requirements of Chapter 11.
(14) Subdivisions, subject to Chapter 13
where each lot meets requirements
of the zone in which it is located.

-

-

C

C

P

P
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"Findings"

No.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER,
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS,
and ETHEL S. RAYMOND,

c"r-

AUG
Qtri

H "1993

of

Su^

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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> Co,"My

°"P^Q|^-.

Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION,
and UTELITE CORPORATION,

C i v i l No.

10718

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing July
8, 1991, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.

The

Plaintiffs were represented by Jeffrey W. Appel of Haley &
Stolebarger, Defendants Summit County was represented by Franklin
P. Anderson and Defendant Utelite Corporation was represented by
John T. Nielsen.

Argument was heard with respect to Defendant

Utelite and Summit County's Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Having heard the arguments

of counsel and being fully advised of the premises, the Court
makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court hereby adopts the following Findings of Fact:
1.

In the Fall of 1988, Defendant Utelite Corporation

(hereinafter "Utelite") decided to relocate a railroad loadout
facility (hereinafter "Utelite facility") to Echo, Utah.

tf&\

2.

On December 13, 1988, Utelite went before the Summit

County Planning Commission seeking approval for construction of
the facility in Echo.
3.

The posted agenda for the December 13, 1988 meeting of

the Planning Commission provides no notice to the public that
there would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation
and construction of the Utelite facility.
4.

The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the

Planning Commission contain no reference to a discussion or any
testimony concerning the proposed relocation and construction of
the Utelite facility.
5.

Utelite received verbal permission at the December 13,

1988 meeting of the Planning Commission to begin construction of
the facility.
6.

On January 13, 1989, Jack Willis on behalf of Robert

McGregor, Chairman of the Planning Commission, sent a letter to
Utelite confirming a discussion at the December 13, 1988 meeting
of the Planning Commission regarding the proposed relocation of
the Utelite facility.
7.

The January 13, 1989 letter indicated that it was the

consensus of the Planning Commission that the Utelite operation
could be moved to the Echo location and would be considered a
"permitted use" at the Echo site.
8.

Construction of the Utelite facility began on or about

February 21, 1989 at a location directly across from and adjacent
to a residential area of Echo in which Plaintiffs reside.
2
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9.

On February 28, 1989, Utelite applied for and received

from Summit County, building permit # 89007, which is
specifically designated as an "electrical permit."
10.

The Utelite facility was substantially completed by

April 25, 1989, at which time the first loading of railroad cars
took place.
11.

In October 1989, Utelite made application for a

building permit from Summit County, which permit was issued on
November 28, 1989 as building permit # 89291 for the construction
of the loadout facility in Echo.

CONCLUSION
The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that:
1.

Plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action

pursuant to the terms of the Summit County Development Code, the
laws of the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
2.

Union Pacific Railroad is not an indispensable party to

this action.
3.

Plaintiffs in this instance were not required to

exhaust administrative remedies for the reason that due process
and other constitutional rights are involved and were violated.
4.

The statute of limitations contained in the open

meeting law Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1 et seq. has not been violated
due to application of the equitable tolling doctrine.
5.

The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the
3

00i)d6u

approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite
Corporation v/as in violation of the provisions of the Summit
County Development Code and, thus, that decision is null and
void,
6.

The decision of Defendant Summit County concerning the

approval of utilization of the site currently occupied by Utelite
Corporation was made in violation of the provisions of the Open
Meeting Act Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1- et seq.
7.

Injunctive relief requiring the County to ensure the

removal of the Utelite facility is granted with the stay of the
effectiveness of that portion of this order for sixty (60) days
from the date of this order,
DATED this >Z3

day of August, 199 3-

Honorable Homer .Fv'"Wilkinson

::nO^
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No.

F
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

"I"L"E 0

AUG 23
1993
O.H

of

Sur

»rn;f

Cou

OfXity Q*k

JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER,
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS,
and ETHEL S. RAYMOND,

ORDER FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,

v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION,
and UTELITE CORPORATION,

Civil No. 10718
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants,

IT

IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

Plaintiffs

Motion for Partial Summary judgment is granted and that the actions
of Defendant Summit County with respect to the zoning decision
allowing Utelite to occupy its current site was accomplished in
violation of law, the Summit County Development Code, and the Open
Meeting's Act and is thus null and void for the following reasons:
1.

The acts and omissions of the Defendants leading to the

emplacement of the Utelite Facility in Echo, Utah, were contrary to
the Summit County Development Code and are therefore null and void.
2.

Defendants actions were in violation of the Open and

Public Meeting's law, Utah Code Ann, § 52-4-1 et seq.
3.

Defendants

acts and omissions have harmed

Plaintiffs

without providing them due process of law.

ew\&»t'v\ TA hv.jLr r- 1 f

000^8-
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4.

The effectiveness of this order is stayed for sixty (60)

days from the date this order is entered.

If no appeal is taken

within that time period, then an injunction

shall

issue and

Defendant Summit County shall be required to effectuate the removal
of Utelite from their currently occupied site.
5.

Defendant

Utelite

Corporation

and

Defendant

Summit

County's Motions to Dismiss are denied.
DATED this

day of August, 1993.
So Ordered:

H o n o r a b l e Homer F . Wi^^jun^c©/^^"*^

DflAi/n P Rjfir
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Addendum. A. 5

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
3 32 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

October 27, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

TILED

3rd Dist. Court Summit County
Appeals Clerk
Summit County Courthouse
PO Box 128
Coalville, UT
84017

°=T 23 M3
&** of Summit Courrfy

*..._
D

^*tyO«i

Jane Harper, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Summit County, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants,

.J^

No. 930461
10718

THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having
been heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently
advised in the premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory
appeal be, and the same is, denied.

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

(J00>i8i

Addendum A. 6

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
John T. Nielsen (#2408) u
Eric C. Olson (fl4108)^
Attorneys for Defendant Utelite Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

L'OU. .)• cyjm.ni: Ov"'.:r,ry

^

-dr~

Deputy OP&.

,

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY

ty\rO

STATE OF UTAH

.bf

JANE HARPER, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN,
RICHARD RICHINS and THE
DICKER HILL TRUST,

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plainti f fs,

Civil No. 90-03-10718
Honorable Pat 3. Brian

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
UTELITE CORPORATION,
Defendants.

On May 30, 1995, this Court heard argument in the
above matter with respect to the various motions of the parties
for partial summary judgment on claims and defenses m
action.

this

The plaintiffs were represented by James L.

Warlaumont.

The Summit County defendants were represented by

Jody K Burnett and Franklin P. Andersen.

The defendant Utelite

Corporation ("Utelite") was represented by Eric C. Olson.

By

agreement of the parties, the hearing took place in Salt Lake
City, Utah rather than in Summit County, Utah.

/
13?\777fj8 1

BOOKTTPAGE 7 5 4
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The Court having reviewed the submissions of the
parties, having heard the argument of counsel and being
otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Utelite' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim of nuisance per se is denied.
2.

Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim of trespass is denied.
3.

Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress is granted.

There exists no genuine issue of material

fact with respect to the alleged outrageousness of Utelite's
conduct and Utelite is entitled to judgment on the Tenth Cause
of Action as a matter of law.

Nothing in this Order, however,

shall limit the plaintiffs from claiming damages for emotional
distress under their nuisance and trespass claims.
4.

Utelite's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

the claim for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-56 is granted and the Eleventh Cause of Action is
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' renewing said
claim after the conclusion of trial.
5.

The plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on Utelite' s defenses of estoppel, waiver and laches
is denied.
6.

The Court reserves until after the jury trial

herein any ruling on Summit County's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the claim for award of attorney' s fees and costs

U:'\/7/b8 1

BOQK'U^ 7 5 5

under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as well as Utah Code Ann. §
54-2-9.
DATED t h i s

ip

day of

isJcn) 1 9 9 5 .

—7

M B . Brian, / G
J uL
d g-e
T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ^WIMII/I/,,,
vvNV % K
Summit County
' ""''
A p p r o v e d as t o Form:
%

<&*> 2 U*

^ftorneys

for

Plaintiffs
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% o>>

A t t o y r i e y s (flor Summit County
fendants
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No.

FILED
Preliminary Instruction To The Jury

^'

-»• J

'995

Clark ot
of Summit County C
Udrt

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

^

r

* <£/9fMty Cttcfc* "****'"*•••

In order to clarify certain issues in this case the court instructs you as follows:
In 1991, Judge Homer Wilkinson, of this court, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment found that: (The ruling was signed August 23, 1993)
1. On December 13, 1988 Utelite received verbal permission from the Summit County
Planning Commission to begin construction of its facility in Echo, Utah.
2. On January 13, 1989, a letter was sent to Utelite on behalf of the Planning
Commission which indicated that it was the consensus of the Planning Commission that the
Utelite operation could be moved to the Echo location and would be considered a "permitted
use" at the Echo site.
The court ruled at that time, however, that the actions of Summit County allowing
Utelite to occupy the site in Echo were contrary to the Summit County Development Code
and in violation of Utah's Open Public Meeting law, and that, therefore, the County's actions
were null and void.
The court then ordered that the county remove the Utelite facility from Echo. There
was no express finding against Utelite and Utelite was not subject to the courts order.
The order to remove the facility has been stayed pending an appeal of that order by
the county.
Implicit in Judge Wilkinson's ruling is the conclusion that the placement of the Utelite
facility in Echo is in violation of the Summit County Development Code and this court has so
ruled. Hence, my previous instruction to you that the location of the facility, being in
violation of the Development Code is a nuisance per se, or as a matter of law
This ruling by the court that the facility is a nuisance as a matter of law does not
mean, by itself, that the plaintiffs have or have not suffered damages. You as the jury are to
decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether the plaintiffs have suffered damages and,
if so, the amount that will fairly compensate the plaintiffs. You will further be asked to
decide whether the plaintiffs are entitled, by clear and convincing evidence, to receive
punitive damages, and if so the amount of such damages.

UlJfcj
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No

F I LE D
FEB 2 7 1996 /a'-;
Clerk ot Summit County
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMM*!'!1 lULfemLctoft
STATE OF UTAH

JANE HARPER, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN,
RICHARD RICHINS and THE
DICKER HILL TRUST,

FINAL JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 90-03-1071!
Judge Frank G. Noel

vs
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
UTELITE CORPORATION,

No. .

F

' L ED
:HSG

Defendants
QeHt of S.ur
*mit

county

The damage claims by the plaintiffs herein against
the defendant Utelite Corporation were tried to a jury in this
Court on September 12 through 15, 1995.

The Court also heard

the evidence with respect to the plaintiffs' claim for
equitable relief supplementary to any such relief already
awarded in this action.
Judge Frank G. Noel presided at the trial.
plaintiffs were represented by James L. Warlaumont.
defendant was represented by Eric C. Olson.

The
The

The Court now

enters its Final Judgment in this action disposing of all
remaining claims in this matter.
Before the commencement of trial, the Court
determined that the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment
entered on August 23, ](_)93 by Judge Homer Wilkinson (the

"Wilkinson Order11) was law of the case and, by implication, the
Wilkinson Order included the finding that the Utelite loading
facility was in violation of the Summit County Development
Code.

Based on this finding implicit in the Wilkinson Order,

the Court further held that the Utelite loading facility in
Echo, Utah was a nuisance per se.
The parties thereafter stipulated to the dismissal
without prejudice of all remaining theories of liability-nuisance, trespass and negligence--advanced by the plaintiffs
against the defendant Utelite Corporation.

This stipulation

did not affect or apply to the claims resolved by Judge
Wilkinson's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment.

The

defendant Utelite expressly waived its right to assert the bar
of the statute of limitations with respect to any claim so
dismissed without prejudice.
The issue of liability being resolved as a matter of
law and all other remaining theories of liability being
dismissed without prejudice, only the issues of actual and
punitive damages were submitted for consideration by the jury.
The Court submitted the following interrogatories to the jury
as part of a Special Verdict, which were answered as indicated:
Please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence.

If you find the

evidence preponderates in favor of the issue

2?\\0OQ\>0

\

~

presented, answer "Yes."

If you find the evidence is

so equally balanced that you cannot determine a
preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that
the evidence preponderates against the issue
presented, answer "No."

Also, any damages assessed

must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
1.

Was Utelite loading facility a proximate

cause of damages to:
Richard Harper

Yes

X

No

Jane Harper

Yes
Yes

X
X

No

Frank Cattelan

Yes
Yes

X
X

No

Richard Richins &
the Dicker Hill Trust

Yes
Yes

X
X

No

If you answered question 81 "yes" as to any of
the plaintiffs then go on to the next questions.
Otherwise have the foreperson sign the verdict form
and return to the courtroom.
2.

If you answered question #1 "yes" as to any

of the plaintiffs then as to that plaintiff answer
the following questions:
What amount of money will fairly compensate the
plaintiffs for damages sustained as a result of the
loading facility and its operation?
General Damages:

(adverse health effects,

inconvenience, annoyance, discomfort, loss of

BOOKlTiiPAGE 9 0 2
0?/l 3/90
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enjoyment of home and property, mental distress and
emotional injury to the date of trial.)
Richard Harper

$5,000

Jane Harper

$5,000

Frank Cattelan

$3,00C

Richard Richins &
the Dicker Hill Trust

$1,500

Reduction in Market Value of Property Affected:
Richard and Jane Harper

$

C

Frank Cattelan
Richard Richins &

$

C

the Dicker Hill Trust

$_

Loss of Business Income:
Frank Cattelan

$

Considering all the evidence in the case, do
you find from clear and convincing evidence that
plaintiffs are entitled to an award of punitive and
exemplary damages, against Utelite Corporation?
Answer:

Yes

No

X

The Court having reviewed the Special Verdict of the
jury, having heard the evidence at trial, having considered the
argument and submissions of counsel and being otherwise duly
and sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

BOOKUUPAGE 9 0 3

^

1.

The plaintiff Jane Harper is awarded judgment

against the defendant Utelite Corporation in the amount of
$5,000 with interest thereon at the statutory rate from the
date of this Judgment.
2.

The plaintiff Richard Harper is awarded

judgment against the defendant Utelite Corporation in the
amount of $5,000 with interest thereon at the statutory rate
from the date of this Judgment.
3.

The plaintiff Frank Cattelan is awarded

judgment against the defendant Utelite Corporation in the
amount of $3,000 with interest thereon at the statutory rate
from the date of this Judgment.
4.

The plaintiffs Richard Richins and the Dicker

Hill Trust are jointly awarded judgment against the defendant
Utelite Corporation in the amount of $1,500 with interest
thereon at the statutory rate from the date of this Judgment.
5.

With respect to the plaintiffs' claims for

property damages, loss of business income and punitive damages,
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendant Utelite
Corporation and against the plaintiffs and said claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
6.

The court does not grant the plaintiffs any

equitable relief apart from such equitable relief as the

DOOKU" PAGE 9 0 4
77UMOOUO \

r

^
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3

plaintiffs may be entitled to pursuant to the terms of the
Wilkinson order.

"7C
DATED th is

/0

day o f ^oyewfeer, 1996

Frank G. Noel,
Third J u d i c i a l
Summit County

Distric&^^M&W'io,,,
Distri^O\Jt^>
^Vs
%%%
1 %COUNTy
^

2;t\SOOM> 1
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NO.

F i LE D
MAY 1 7 1996
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Eric C. Olson (#4108K
By
Attorneys for Defendant Utelite Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Cleft of Summit County

Deputy Oortc

j£-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D.
HARPER, FRANK CATTELAN,
RICHARD RICHINS and THE
DICKER HILL TRUST,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
RE: EQUITABLE RELIEF

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 90-03-10718
vs

Honorable Frank G. Noel

SUMMIT COUNTY, a body
politic, the SUMMIT COUNTY
COMMISSION, SUMMIT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION and
UTELITE CORPORATION,
Defendants

The Court heard evidence at the trial in this action
held on September 12 through 15, 1S95.

The Court has issued

Minute Entries dated February 13, 1996 and April 25, 1996 with
respect to the plaintiffs' claim for equitable relief
supplementary to any such relief already awarded in this
action.

The Court has also entered its Final Judgment of

Special Verdict resolving, inter
for equitable relief.

U-'UiMOO 1

alia,

the plaintiffs' claim

On the basis of the jury's verdict and the Court's
independent determination of facts based on its view of the
evidence presented at trial including a personal view of the
properties in question, the Court now enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The defendant Utelite Corporation ("Utelite")

operates a loading facility (the "Facility") adjacent to the
Union Pacific railroad tracks at Echo, Utah.
2.
the Facility.

The plaintiffs own property in the vicinity of
The Union Pacific railroad tracks that run

through Echo, Utah lie between the Facility and the property
owned by Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper and Frank Cattelan.
Trains go through Echo, Utah on these tracks in excess of
fifteen to twenty times per day.
3.

At the Facility on a weekly basis, Utelite loads

an average of six and one-half railroad cars with its kiln
dried aggregate products.
4.

Semi-trucks transport the aggregate product to

the Facility for loading.

It takes four trucks approximately

forty minutes to load a single railroad car.
5.

The Utelite Facility currently operates, with

occasional exceptions, on weekdays during daylight hours.

2

6.

To deal with dust from the loading operations,

Utelite has taken the following steps:
a.

i

Construction of a metal enclosure at the

Facility.
b.

Installation of a bag house and duct work

at the Facility.
c.

Paving of the access road to the Facility.

d.

Installation of curtains and an electric

I

door at the Facility.
e.

Watering down aggregate at the Utelite

plant.

J
i

f.

Installation of a hood and metal coverings

over the conveyor belt and drop areas at the

J

Facility.

I

g.

j
i

Response to resident complaints called in

to the Utelite plant including termination of
loading on windy days.
7.

To deal with noise problems from the operation

of the Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps:
a.

Installation of a muffler on the bag house, j

b.

Instruction to truckers not to bang

J

railroad cars in connection with loading.
8.

To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has:

j

a.

Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility.

i

b.

Terminated night loading.

c.

Instructed truck drivers to yield to other

vehicles seeking access to the frontage road on
the far side of Interstate 84 through the road
at the Facility.
9.

As a result of the actions taken by Utelite,

confirmed by the Court's visit to the Facility while in
operation and the Court's and third-party's reviev; of videos,
tapes and photographs of the Facility in operation, the
Facility at present (a) is not injurious to the plaintiffs, (b)
does not adversely affect the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of
their property, and (c) does not cause any property damage to
the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has equitable power pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-38-1 to enjoin cr abate any nuisance created by
Utelite at the Facility.
2.

The Court has found solely by reason of Judge

Wilkinson's August 23, 1993 Crier and the findings implicit in
that ruling that the Facility is a nuisance per se.
3.

Notwithstanding the Court's finding that the

Facility is a nuisance per se, m

order to obtain further

equitable relief from this Couit wit:: respect to the present
operation of the Facility, the plaintiffs have the burden of
proving that the Facility presently is injurious to their

IJ'^0300 1

health, is offensive to the senses, or obstructs the free use
and enjoyment of their property.
4.

The plaintiffs have failed to meet that burden

of proof and are not entitled to any further equitable relief
from this Court other than the equitable relief previously
granted by Judge Wilkinson.
%

DATED this

day of

?//. 1996.

y

Frank G. N o e l ,
Third J u d i c i a l
Summit
Countv
Summit County

Approved as to Form:

Distr^oi^Jjtttjcw^
Dis£ggffi«>>>wk!f$frs/
v^vV^
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/ V SUMMIT
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^COUNTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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i^O.

JEFFREY W. APPEL (3630)
JAMES L. WARLAUMONT (33 86)
BENJAMIN T. WILSON (5823)
COLLARD, APPEL & WARLAUMONT
1100 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801)532-1252

^rrr D
'*AY|

me
County

^WtyChrk

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JANE HARPER, RICHARD D. HARPER,
FRANK CATTELAN, RICHARD RICHINS,
and THE DICKER HILL TRUST,

ORDER RE: AWARD OF
PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY'S
FEES

Plaintiffs,
v.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body politic, the
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION, and the
SUMMIT COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION,
and UTELITE CORPORATION,

Civil No. 90-03-10718
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion for an Order Awarding Costs and Attorneys
Fees and the Summit County Defendants Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on this issue came before the Court on November 13, 1995.
Plaintiffs were represented by James L. Warlaumont; the Summit
County Defendants were represented by Jody Burnett; and, Defendant
Utelite was represented by Eric Olson.

The Court heard oral

argument thereon and took the matter under advisement.

On February

13, 1996, the Court entered a Minute Entry denying the Plaintiffs'

BOOK VV PAGE 2 ' 0

motion for attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 awarding
attorney's fees under Utah's Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah
Code Ann. §52-42-9 (1953, as amended).
In accordance with the Court's Minute Entry,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees is granted under

Utah Code Ann. § 52-42-9.
Defendants

pay

$ (I ,

The Court orders that the Summit County

\_>U

to

the

Plaintiffs

for

their

attorneys fees.
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs under 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1588 is denied.

DATED this.^2 "^)

day of April, 1996.
BY THE COURT

Frank G. Noel
v
v..
Third District Court Judg£V^

farf

X^?>
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yS.am/nfl'

£>.otintp'

'

fflaft/u/ty

fjc.Pvutetcft'

Summit County Court House
Coalville, Utah 84017

N o t i c e i s hereby r i v n n t i n t fit? Summit CounW I 1 m n j n p Comrnrsion v.- I l l I o l d
t h e i r re/^ulnr m e e t i n g on Tuesdny December 1 ' , 1r^V>, l ^ f i n n i n p , n t 7 : 7 0 p.m. i n
thp OLD SUMMIT COUNTY aXJKTHUUH, County C o u r t l c u r ^ , C o n l v i l l p , Ufcih.

The proposed i p p n d a i s a s f o l l o w s :
Southwest Bank, M i c h r W H i ley - C o n t i n u e review f o r e x t e n s i o n o f Uv C l ' i s s ?.
Development H e r m i t f o r Sun P e i k , n h i r f e - s c U e r m s t n r p i * n n « d
o q u e s t r i a n / r e c r o ' j t i o n community. ( I . o o : i t i o n - S ^ l i o n r , ?S f ?f» 9t Jf> Township 1
So. Knnpe 3 E. S S e c t i o n s % R 51 Township 1 So. P / l l \ . SUWW)
A c t i o n o n g v m o b j l 0 , Ken Myors -Request for r^n<n;"»l o r ^ c o n d i t i o n a l u r r p e r m i t
f o r seasonal snowmobile r ^ n b i l s 1/4 m i l e west o f U r US / l n i n d S t n t p l l i r k v i y
2 4 ^ i n t e r s e c t i o n . (Goutlwpst Q m r t o r , S e c t i o n v ; Tavnship 1 S o u t h , V~mni A i-nst
SLBSfl)
Commission & St7<ff -Review o f Developm?nt Code r e v i s i o n s .

Not LeRil
Publislcd December Pf<jf10
The Phrk Record

The Summit County IVv^
Postr?d December 2 ,

1<W
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MINUTES OF TDK PLAMNLir. aKUrSIOI)
MFKI'TNC. Hl'Xn
DI'L'LMbl-K 15, VR'U

PREShWf: Robert McGregor, Chairman
LaMar Pace
Susan Glasminn
DelRay Hatch

A13SKNT:

Jorry Smith, Planning Director
Anita Lewis, Planning Coordinator
Franklin Anderson, Dep. County Attorney

Rom Id Robinson, Brent Ovard, Larry Sin [Kind

The meeting was c a l l e d to order a t 7:30 p.m. by Chairman, Robert McGregor.

Southwest Bank, Michael Riley - Continue review fcr extension of tb? Class 2
Development Permit for Sun Peak, a l a r n ? - s c a l e master planned
e q u e s t r i a n / r e c r e a t i o n community. (Location - .Sections 25,26 ft 36 Township 1
So. Range 3 E. & Sections 30 & 31 Township 1 So. R 4E. SLB*M)
Franklin Andersen s t a t e d a t the November 22, 1°W Planning Commission meeting
the Planning Commission asked Mr. Andersen to research if Southvest Bank could
be considered the o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a n t . Being the o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a n t , the tine
l i m i t on the permit could be extended. Mr. Andersen said he cou]d not address
the question with a "yes" or f,nofI answer. Mr. Andersen told tfx? Planning
Commission i f they were very technical tlie Planning Commission could S3y Sun
Peak i n c . was the o r i g i n a l a p p l i c a n t . The Planning Commission could be
equitable in saying the Southvest Bank was UK? original a p p l i c a n t a s ttr>
p a r t i c i p a t i n g financing party and owner of portion of tlie land. The Planning
Commission in t h e i r own d i s c r e t i o n can extend the permit.
Michael Riley said the Southwest Bank Ins Ind clear t i t l e of Uie property
mid sumner. Mr. Riley said when p o t e n t i a l buyers ask about the property
f i r s t question i s price and th? second question i s what can be done with
property. Mr. Riley said millions of d o l l a r s hive been invested in tlie
property, the o r i g i n a l owners i n t e n t was to develop the property t h i s i s
reason for tl)e extension.

since
the
the
tie

Robert McGregor asked i f p o t e n t i a l buyers of tt«? pro[)erty are interested in
developing the property a s was presented by Sun Peak?
Michael Riley said he does not have a p o t e n t i a l buyer a t the? present t i n e
Riley said i n t e r e s t e d buyers would probably not develop a s an equestrian
complex.

Mr.

Robert McGregor said when Sun Peak Jnc. received t IT? Class 2 approval i t was
without a d e f i n i t e d e n s i t y .

EXHIBIT C
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Planning Commission Minutes
December 13, 19B8

J e r r y Smith said the code s t a t e s an extension of a permit can bo for two years
but cannot be extended beyond the two y e a r s .
LaMar Pace made a motion to g r a n t fix* extension for two years a s was presented
with no d e n s i t i e s determined.
Sus3n Glasrrann seconded th? motion.
All were in favor of the motion.

Tho motion c a r r i e d .

Action Snowmobile, Ken Myers - Request for renewal of a conditional use
permit for seasonal snowmobile r e n t a l s 1/4 mile west of the US 40 and State
Highway 248 i n t e r s e c t i o n . (Southwest Quarter, Section 35 Township 1 South,
Rang? 4 Fast SLB&M)
Ken Myers s t a t e d he i s asking for a renewa] of a conditional use permit for a
snowmobile r e n t a l business. The location would ba approximately .4 of a mile
west of Quinns Junction. Mr. Myers said a t the s i t e th?re w i l l be a t r a i l e r
for the storage of r e p a i r t o o l s . He will a l s o provide off road parking.
Mr. Myers said tire fence line w i l l be patroled so Ui?re would not be a
t r e s p a s s problem.
Latter Pace asked i f the fuel storage had been approved by Ut? Fire Marshall.
Mr. P&ce S3id during tlie l a s t season the Fire Marslnll expressed concerns over
the fuel s t o r a g e .
Ken Myers r e p l i e d he had not checked with the Fire Marshall on U>e fuel storage.
DelRay Hatch made a motion to g r a n t th? conditional use permit for tiie winter
season through April 16 sub t ject t o : 1) t i e fence line being patroled, no
trespassing 2) one sign banner placed on the mobile home that meets with
the developm?nt code 3) approval from the Fire Marstiill regirding tlx? fuel
storage.
LaMar Pace seconded the motion.
All were in favor of the motion.

The motion c a r r i e d .

Commission & Staff - Review of Development Code r e v i s i o n s .
J e r r y Smith reviewed the Development Code Revisions with the Planning
Commission. Robert McGregor asked t h a t Jerry Smith and Franklin Anderson
review the Development Code Revisions and form a language t t n t can be added to
tiie County Master Plan.

0000.U

Planning Commission Minutes
December 13, 1900

Minutes o f the November 23, 1988 Planning Commission Meeting were approved as
presented.
Meeting adjourned a t 9:00 p.m.
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Cars ten Mortensen
P.O. Box 587
C o a l v i l l e , UT 84017
RE:

Relocation of U t o l i l r Fncil I UCT.

Dear Mr. Mortensen:

This i s to conilrm a discussion i t tlr? December 13th Planning Commission
meeting re/jarding the r e l o c a t i o n of tlx? f a c i l i t i e s .
11 was tlie consensus of Ur^ Connussion tlT31 tlr? U l e l i t o operation presently s e t up in Wanship on tlx? Union Pacific r a i l r o a d l i n e s could Ix? raved !o tlx? ECIXD
l o c a t i o n . This would be considered a permi tied use a t tlr? £dx3 s i t e .
i f you have any q u e s t i o n s please c a l l tlx? Summit County Planning Office a t
356-4451 e x t . 306.
Sincerely,

Robert McCrep.or, Clnirnon
Summit County Planning Commission

EXHIBIT A
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17-27-5

COl'NTIKS

ZONING AND PLANNING

ground.*, place.-, .spaces, properties, utilities, or terminals; methods to encourage energy-efficient patterns of developments, the use of energy conservation,
solar and renewable energy sources, and assure access to sunlight for solar
energy devices; the general character, location, and extent of community center.-, town sites, or housing developments; the general location and extent of
tnrest. and open development areas for purposes of conservation, and water
-upply. sanitary and drainage facilities, or the protection of urhan development

NOTKS TO DKCISIONS

17-27-6.

History:
L. 1911. ch. 23. i 4; ( \ 1913.
!!• -21-1; L. 19.V1. t h. 27. J 1; 1981. ch. 44, 5 5.
NOTKS TO DKCISIONS
Cower of c o m m i s s i o n before a d o p t i o n of
maMer plan.

to pu*v«« n valid zoning ordinance prior to adopHon of » master plan. Clayland v. Salt I^nke

A o unt> planning commission has authontv

County. 11 I'tah 2d 307. 358 P 2d 633 (196D.

COI.LATKHAJ, HKKKHK.NTKS
I tah I J I U | ( r \ i r w .
I'tah U-gi-lutiw
if..\
19*1 19*2 I tah I. Ktv 12.r>. 1 T>I
Am J u r . 2d.
**J Am .Jur 2d Zoning

17-27-5.

C..J.S.
HU CMS Zoning 55 11 to 13
Key Number*. - - Zoning «- 15.

General purposes in making master plan.

In the preparation of a county master plan, a county planning commission
•hall make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of the existing
nndition> and prohahle future growth of the territory within its jurisdiction.
II
I he county master plan shall he made with the general purpose of guiding
Hid accomplishing a co-ordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of
he county which will, m accordance with present and future needs and re»urce>. best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosper:\. or the general welfare of the inhahitants, as well as efficiency and econmy in the process of development, including, amongst other things, such
iistnhution of population and of the uses of land for urbanization, trade,
:,fiu>try, habitation, recreation, agriculture, arboretum and other purposes,
- will tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, energy conservamn. transport.ition. prosperity, CIVIC activities, and recreational, educational
ind cultural opportunities; will tend to reduce the wastes of physical, finanial. or human resources which result from either excessive congestion or
\cessive scattering of population: and will tend toward an efficient and ecoornical utilization, conservation and production of the supply of food and
. ater. and ot drainage, sanitary, and other facilities and resources.
Hi-t«»r>: I. 1911. ch 23. 4 5; ('.
9 21-5. I.. 19M1. rh. II. i 6.

4b8

Kcclnniiifiration.
Where a floral company situated on "Agricultural Zone A-1" land and surrounded hy re*idential and agricultural properU recpie.Hted
and wan gTantt^d rvclawufication of it* property
to "C 2" and "KM" tones permitting the erecHon of multifamily dwellings, the reclassifica-

17-27-7

tion did not constitute ".spot toning" U c a u s e it
was compatible with the existing master plan
nnd therefore not arhitrary. capricious, or an
abuse of the zoning authonU's discretion
Crc*tview.-Hollada> Homeowners. A.-- n \
K n g h Klor.il ("o . 5-15 V 2d 1150 <i:tah li*7t>.

Method of adopting master plan.

A county planning commission may adopt the county master plan as a
whole hy a single resoution, or, as the work of making the whole master plan
progresses, may from time to time adopt a part or parts thereof, any such part
to correspond generally with one or more of the functional .subdivisions of the
subject matter which may be included in the plan. The commission may from
time to time amend, extend, or add to the plan, or carry any part of it into
greater detail. The adoption of the plan or any part, amendment, extension, or
addition shall be by resolution carried by the affirmative votes of not less than
a majority of the entire membership of the commission and after a full hearing shall have been had thereon after notice of such hearing shall have been
given once each week for four successive weeks in a newspaper having general
circulation in, and most likely to give notice to the residents of the localitv
which would be affected thereby. The resolution shall refer expressly to the
plans and descriptive matter intended by the commission to form the v.hole or
part of the plan, and the action taken shall be recorded on the plan or plans
and descriptive matter by the identifying signature of the chairman of the
commission The master plan shall be available for public inspection in the
office of the planning commission at all reasonable times, but its purpose and
effect shall be solely to aid the planning commission in the performance of its
duties
History: I.. I » l l . ch. 2.1, * (J; ('. 1913.
19-21-fl; L 19.W. eh. 27, % 1.

( ot.l.All.RAl. KKKKKKNChS
A.I..K.

Disqualification

h i a s of a d m i n i s t r a t o r
proofing.

17-27-7.

foi

interest

or

officer f i t t i n g in z o n i n g

10 A I. It .Id *>!U

Right

to < m.s.s ,-v.,,ttin.it i<>n of

uitnr-.-<s

h e a r i n g s hefoie udmitnM i .iln e zoning
i t \ . 27

A 1> H dd

in

awiht.i

l.'Ull

Adoption of official map — Amendments.

The board of county commissioners of any county is hereby empowered.
after receiving the advice of the county planning commission to adopt and
establish an official map of the county showing the highways. frcewa>s.
parks, parkways and sites for public buildings or works, including subsurface
facilities, in the acquisition, financing, or construction of which the count>
has participated or may be called upon to participate. Such map. in addition to
showing existing public streets, may show the location of the lines of streets
on plats of subdivisions which shall have been appro\ed b\ the planning
•1B7

17-27-9

17-27-9.

COUNTIES

Power of commission to regulate height and size
of buildings and height and location of trees and
other vegetation — Regulations to encourage use
of solar and other forms of energy.

The county planning commission of any county may, and upon order ofthe
board of county commissioners in any county having a county planning commission shall, make a zoning plan or plans for zoning all or any part of the
unincorporated territory within such county, including both the full text of
the zoning resolution or resolutions and the maps, and representing the recommendations of the commission for the regulation by districts or zones of the
location, orientation, heights, bulk, and size of buildings and other structures,
percentage of lot which may be occupied, the size of lots, courts, and other
open spaces, the density and distribution of population, the height and location of trees and other vegetation, the location and use of buildings and structures for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities or other purposes, and the uses of land for trade, industry, recreation or other purposes.
Regulations and restrictions ofthe height and number of stories of buildings
and other structures, and the height and location of trees and other vegetation
shall not apph to existing buildings, structures, trees, or vegetation except for
new growth on such vegetation These regulations may also encourage energy
efficient patterns of developments, the use of solar and other renewable forms
of energy, and energy conservation and may assure access to sunlight for solar
energy devices
Hi*tor>: L. 1911. eh. 23. 6 9; C. 1943.
19-21-9; L 1981. ch. 41. 5 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

ZONING AND P A N N I N G

17-2

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . J u r . 2d. — 82 Am Jur 2d Zoning
47 to 56
C I . 8 . — 101 C J S Zoning 55 9. 11 to 13.
202

K e y N u m b e r * . — Zoning *» 13. 15.

»

17-27-10.

Planning commission "certification o f zoni
plan to county commissioners — Public hearin

The county planning commission shall certify a copy ofthe plan or plan
zoning all or any part ofthe unincorporated territory within the count \
any adopted part or amendment thereof, or addition thereto, to the boat
county commissioners of the county. After receiving the certification of
zoning plan or plans from the commission and before the adoption ot
zoning resolution or resolutions, the board of county commissioners shall \
a public hearing thereon, ofthe time and place of which at least thirty d
notice shall be given by four publications in a newspaper of general cm
tion in the county. Such notice shall state the place at which the text or i
so certified by the county planning commission may be examined. No sub^i
tial change in or departure from the text or map so certified by the coi.
planning commission shall be made unless such change or departure be t
submitted to the certifying county planning commission for its approval
approval or suggestions, and if disapproved shall receive the favorable \m
not less than a majority of the entire membership of the board of cot
commissioners. The county planning commission shall have thirls days t
and after such submission within which to send its report to the county <
missioners.
History: I - 1911. ch. 23. 5 10; C. 11M3,
19-24-10."

ANAI \ M ^

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Unzoiu d land
Zoning p*.wer in Mineral

amendment Melville v Salt 1-ake Count\
P 2 d 133 (I'tah 19751

Amendments.
Unzoned land cannot be initially zoned hy

U n z o n e d land.
Zoning ordinance doe* not applv rr«trospectivelv to denv n UM» permit to the owner of
unzoned p m p t m who did everything required
of hirn undir the exi-tmg laws Contract*
Funding & Mtg Exih \ Mavnes. 527 V 2d
10,3 11 tab 19. l>
Zoning p o w e r in g e n e r a l .
Court.- would nut permit a violation of a
clear mandate of/orung authorities on the ha«i* of reliance on advice of cuun«*-l. or on the
ha«is of hard-hip due to compliance or on the
ha.^is that jt was not shown that an.vone el»«c
would .-ufler in p« rfH'tuating the statu* quo.

since to do so would open the door for indn»criminate ahum; of zoning regulation* Salt
I^ke County v Hutchinson. 8 Utah 2d 154.
329 1* 2d 657 (19581
Exercise of zoning power is a legislative
function to he exercised by the legislative bodK . h () f municipalities, the wisdom of a toning
plan. its necessity, and the nature and bounda r u s of lnc
'W*
S t r i c t are all matters
within the legislative discretion, and the Supreme Court will avoid substituting it* judgment for that of the zoning authority Crestv»ew-Holladav Homeow ncrs Ass'n v Engh Floral C o . 545 V 2d 1150 (Utah 1976)

470

COLLATERAL
COLLATERAL
Utah !,nw R e v i e w . - Comment. Melville v
Salt l-ake County — Technical Notice A Judicial 1/e.H.son in Avoiding Inevitable Conflicts.
1975 Utah L Rev 520
A m . J u r . 2<f. - 82 Am Jur 2d Zoning 5 49
C.J.S. - 101 C J S Zoning M 12. 14
A.I-K. — Disqualification for interest or

REFERENCES
bias of administrative officer sitting in „
proceeding. 10 A L R 3d 694
Right to tross-examination of witne<hearmgs l>efore administrative zoning an'
ties. 27 A L R 3 d 1301
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning «-> 1 r>

471

17-27-14

COUNTIES

17-27-14. Amending zone or zoning district.
The board of county commissioners may from time to time amend the number, shape, boundaries or area of any zone or zoning district, or any regulation
of or within such zone or zoning district, or any other provisions of the zoning
resolution, but any such amendment shall not be made or become effective
unless the same shall have been proposed by or be first submitted for the
approval, disapproval or suggestions of the county planning commission; and
if disapproved by such commission within thirty days after such submission,
such amendment, to become effective, shall receive the favorable vote of not
less than a majority of the entire membership of the board of county commissioners Before finally adopting any such amendment, the board of county
commissioners shall hold a public hearing thereon, at least thirty days' notice
of the time and place of which shall be given by at least one publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the county.
History: I~ 1911. ch. 23. I 14; ( \ 1913,
10-21-14; L. 198,1. c h . 70. $ I.
Amendment Notes.
The 1983 amend-

ment substituted "rone or zoning dmtrict" in
two places in the firet sentence for "district or
districts"

NOTES TO DECISIONS
P r e v i o u s l y u n / o n c d land.

amendment Melville v Salt I^akc County, 636

I ruoned land cannot h» mitinllwoned bv an

V 2d 133 <Utah 1975*.

ZONING A N D PLANNING

17-27

The board of county commissioners shall provide and specify in its zoning
other resolutions general rules to govern the organization, procedure, jn
jurisdiction of said board of adjustment, which rules shall not be inconsisti"
with the provisions of this act, and the board of adjustment may adopt supplmental rules of procedure not inconsistent with this act or such general rub
Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners may provi<
that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to approp:
ate principles, standards, rules, conditions and safeguards set forth in tl
zoning resolution, make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regul
tions in harmony with their general purpose and intent. The commission*
may also authorize the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning maps ar
pass upon disputed questions of lot lines or district boundary lines or sinul
questions, as they may arise in the administration of the zoning regulation
Meetings of the board of adjustment shall be held at the call of the chairm.
and at such other times as the board in its rules of procedure may specify. Tl
chairman or in his absence the acting chairman, may administer oaths ai
compel the attendance of witnesses. All meetings of the board of adjust me'
shall be open to the public. The board shall keep minutes of its proceedm.
showing the vote of each member upon each question, or if absent or failing
vote, indicating such fact, and shall keep records of its examinations and othofficial actions, all of which shall be immediately filed in the office of tl
board and shall be a public record.
Ilifitory: I* 1941, ch. 23. 5 15; C. 1943,
19-24-15.

M e a n i n g of "this act". — See the nott i
der the same catchline followmg § 17-27 .

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
NOTKS TO DECISIONS
t'tah IJIW R e v i e w .

Comment M e l \ i l l e \

A.I~K. — Disqualification for interest or

Salt l-ake ( ount>
I <.<hnu.il Notice A Judicial I>e^son m Avoiding Inimitable Conflicts.
1.975 Vtuh L Rev .">J0
A m . «Jur. 2d. - 82 Am .lur 2d Zoning
$$ 57 to 59
C^J.S.
101 C.J S Zoning 4 81 et scq

17-27-15.

bias of administrative officer sitting , n zoning
proceeding. 10 A L R 3d 694
Right to cross-examination of witneMc* in
h e a r i n g before administrative zoning authonties. 27 A L R 3d 1304
Key Number*: — Zoning ** 151 ct i*cq

Special exception*.
This section authorizes, but doea not require.
the county commission to invest the board of
adjustment* with the power to issue special exceptions to general ordinances, however.
county commission has authority to place the

Board of adjustment — Regulations — Meetings.

The board of county commissioners of any county which enacts zoning regulations under the authority of this act, shall provide for a hoard of adjustment
of three to five members and for the manner of the appointment of such
members Not more than half of the members of such board may at any time
be members of the planning commission. The board of county commissioners
shall fix per diem compensation and terms for the members of such board of
adjustment, which terms shall be of such length and so arranged that the
term of at least one member will expire each year. Any member of the board of
adjustment may be removed for cause by the board of county commissioners
upon written charges and after a public hearing. Vacancies shall be filled for
the unexpired term in the same manner as in the case of original appointments The board of county commissioners may appoint associate members of
such board, and in the event that any regular member he temporarily unable
to act owing to absence from the county, illness, interest in a case before the
board or any other cause, his place may be taken during such temporary
disability by an associate member designated for the purpose.
476

power to issue special exceptions in the pi
ning commission, and to creale a right of
peal directly to the county commission i t Thurston v Cache County. 626 P 2d 440 (I t
1981)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . .Jur. 2<i. — 82 Arn Jur. 2d Zoning
5 254 et seq

17-27-16.

C.J.S. — 101 C J S Zoning $$ 201 to J'
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning *-• 3 5 1 , 352

Appeals — Powers of board.

Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any person aggrie\<
by his inability to obtain a building permit, or by the decision of any admmi
trative ofTicer or agency based upon or made in the course of tl
adminstration or enforcement of the provisions of the zoning resolution A
peals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any officer, departmei
board or bureau of the county affected by the grant or refusal of a huildu
permit or by other decision of an administrative officer or agency based on
made in the course of the administration or enforcement of the provisionthe zoning resolution. The time within which such appeal must be made, at
the form or other procedure relating thereto, shall be as specified in the g<
•177

17-27-16

COUNTIES

eral rules provided in writing by the board of county commissioners to govern
the procedure of such board of adjustment or in the supplemental rules of
procedure adopted by such board provided further, that said rules and regulations shall be available to the public at the office of the county commissioners
at all times.
Upon appeals the board of adjustment shall have the following powers:
< 1) To hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that
there is error in any order, requirement, decision or refusal made by
administrative official or agency based on or made in the enforcement of
the zoning resolution.
<2i To hear and decide, in accordance with the provisions of any such
resolution, requests for special exceptions or for interpretation of the map
or for decisions upon other special questions upon which such board is
authorized by any such resolution to pass.
<31 Where by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of
a specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the regulation,
or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary
and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of property, the strict
application of any regulation enacted under this act would result in peculiar and exceptional practical difficulties to, or exceptional and undue
hardships upon, the owner of such property, to authorize, upon an appeal
relating to said property, a variance from such strict application so as to
relieve such difficulties or hardship, provided such relief may be granted
without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning resolutions.
The concurring vote of four members of the board in the case of a fivemember board, and of three members in the case of a three-member board,
shall be necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision or determination of any such administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the
appellant.
History: I- 1911. c h . 23, I 16; C. 1943.
19-24-16.

M e a n i n g of "thia act". — See t h e note under the name catchline following i 17-27-2.

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
As An

MS

Appeal to county rommiwinn
Exhaustion of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies
Findings required
Purpose
Violation of zoning resolution
A p p e a l to c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n .
The hoard of adjustments it> constituted hy
statute a forum for r t \ lew of all a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
zoning decision*, hut nowhere is it made the
exclusive repository of appellate powers, the
countv commission has authority to place the
power to issue special exceptions to general or478

dmances in the planning commission, and to
create a right of appeal directly to t h e county
commission ilaclf Thurston v. Cache County,
626 J'2d 440 (Utah 19811.
E x h a u s t i o n of administrative r c m c d l e a .
Where a planning board approved a trailer

ZONING A N D P L A N N I N G
park and issued a building permit to defendant*, plaintiff, a landowner who sought to enjoin t h e defendants from building t h e p a r k .
was aggrieved by the decision although not a
p a r t y to t h e proceedings before the board, and
plaintiff was required to exhaust his administ r a t i v e remedies provided in this section before
an action for injunctive relief could be maintained. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co . 15
U t a h 2d 305. 392 P 2d 40 (19641.
A party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the denial
of a building permit. Hatch v. Utah County
P l a n n i n g Dcp't. 685 P 2d 550 (Utah 1984).
Findings required.
Justification for denial of use permit to
owner of unzoned land may not be based on
h e a r s a y and opinion evidence gathered at an
informal meeting without opportunity to crosse x a m i n e , and without any findings of fact; nor
m a y denial be based on the retrospective application of an ex post facto zoning ordinance.
Contracts Funding & Mtg. Exch. v. Maynes.
527 P 2 d 1073 (Utah 1974).

17 27

Purpose.
T h i s section is designed to assure speed\
peal to the proper tribunal of any g n e \ .
t h a t a party may have who is adverted \
decision of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency Its
dent purpose is to assure the expeditious
orderly development of a community Lun
Cottonwood Meadows Co.. 15 U t a h 2d 305
P 2 d 40 (1964>
V i o l a t i o n of z o n i n g r e s o l u t i o n .
l a n d o w n e r s under & 17-27-23 h a \ e a -•
r a t e cause of action in the court> when a \ .
tion of a zoning resolution is charged
where the alleged violation of the ordin.
arose from the administration of the 7omn,
dinance by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n o . as ,
vided in this section, appeal from the adm,
t r a t i v e ruling should have been t a k e n to
proper a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l , or a
should have l>een commenced in the co
within ninety days. Lund v Cottonv.
Meadows Co.. 15 Utah 2d 305. 392 P 2d
(1964).

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A m . «Jur. 2d.
5 254 et seq

17-27-17.

82 Am

C..I.S. - 101 C I S Zoning ** 207 to
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning «-» 354 to -\>

,Jur. 2d Zoning

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Section 17-27-17 (L. 1941. ch
23. 5 17; C. 1943. 19-24-17; L. 1953. ch. 27.

$ 1). relating to district planning nimiiih
was repealed by I^iws 1983. ch 253. s

17-27-18. Nonconforming uses — Property acquired \
county.
The lawful use of a building or structure, or the lawful use of any land
existing and lawful at the time of the adoption of a zoning resolution, or in
case of an amendment of a resolution, then at the time of such amcndnn
may, except as hereinafter provided, be continued although such use does
conform with the provisions of such resolution or amendment and such
may be extended through the same building, provided no structural altera!
of such building is proposed or made for the purpose of such extension. I
purposes of this section, the addition of a solar energy device to such build
shall not necessarily be considered a structural alteration. The board
county commissioners may provide in any zoning resolution for the rest«
tion, reconstruction, extension or substitution of nonconforming uses m
such terms and conditions as may be set forth in the zoning resolution. I
board of county commissioners may in any resolution provide for the terim
tion of nonconforming uses, either by specifying the period or periods in wl,
nonconforming uses shall be required to cease, or by providing a formul.
formulae whereby the compulsory termination of a nonconforming use ma\
so fixed as to allow for the recovery or amortization of the investment in
nonconformance.
479

17-27-19

roi'NTIES

ZONING AND P L A N N I N G

If any county acquire title to any property by reason of tax delinquency and
such properties be not redeemed as provided by law, the future use of such
property shall be in conformity with the then provisions of the zoning resolution of the county, or with any amendment of such resolution, equally applicable to other like properties within the district in which the property acquired
by the county is located.

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S

NOTKS TO DECISIONS

Effect of ordinance on nonconforming use
Estoppel to enforce zoning ordinance
Kffoct of o r d i n a n c e o n n o n c o n f o r m i n g u s e .
Where there »»!> a protracted period of unexplained vacancy and no b u r n i n g of any nonconforming use of residential property for n period
of \ e a r s . an ordinance against nonconforming
use m the e \ e n t of discontinuance of such use
for one year precluded the issuance of a building permit for a gasoline filling station M o m son v H o m e . 12 Utah 2d 131. 363 V 2d 1113
«1961i

E a t o p p c l to e n f o r c e z o n i n g o r d i n n n c e .
County wwew^or's erroneous description of
property an commercial instead of residential
did not preclude zoning a u t h o r i t i e s from denying a permit for t h e construction of a service
station on a nonconforming use basis.
M o m a i o n v. H o m e . 12 Utah 2d 131, 363 P.2d
1113 (1961).

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
A m . ,Jur. 2d. — 82 Am J u r 2d Zoning
>k4 178 to 236
C..J.S. - 101 CJS
Zoning « 180 to 200
A.I^R. — Amortization of nonconforming
u^f». \ a h d i t > of provisions for. 22 A L R 3d
1134
Construction and application of s t a t u t e or or-

17-27-19.

dinance requiring notice aa prerequisite to
g r a n t i n g variance or exception to zoning requirement. 38 A L R 3 d 167.
Comprehensive plan, requirement t h a t zoning variances or exceptions he made in accordance with. 40 A L R.3d 372.
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning •» 321 to 338

Promulgation of temporary regulations.

The board of county commissioners of any county after appointment of a
county or district planning commission and pending the completion by such
commission of a zoning plan, may, where in the opinion of the board conditions require such action, promulgate by resolution without a public hearing
regulations of a temporary nature, to be effective for a limited period only and
in any event not to exceed six months, prohibiting or regulating in any part or
all of the unincorporated territory of the county or district the erection, construction, reconstruction or alteration of any building or structure used or to
be used for any business, industrial or commercial purpose.
H i s t o r y : I - 1941. c h . 23. 5 19; C. 1943.
19-24-19; L. 1953. c h . 27. 5 1.
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A.I-R. — Validity and effect of " i n t e r i m "
zoning ordinance. 30 A L R 3d 1196

17-27-20.

Repealed.

R e p e a l * . — Section 17 27 20 <L 1941. ch
'23. 5 20. C I'M.'*. H>2l-20». relating to sub-

H i s t o r y : [>. 1941, c h . 2.1. fi 18; C. 1943,
19-24-18. I.. 1981. c h . 44. I 12.

17-27-2,

17-27-21.

mission of plans to state p l a n n i n g commi^Mi.i
* u s repealed b> I-u*j> 1983. ch 2 5 3 . % 1

Land plats — Approval — Sale before approval
as violation.

All plans of streets or highways for public use, and all plans and plats <•
land laid out in subdivision or building lots, and the streets, highways, a)le\
or other portions of the same intended to be dedicated to public use, or the u.of purchasers or owners of loLs fronting thereon or adjacent thereto, locate*
within the county limits, except those located within any city or town wit hi i
the said counties, shall be submitted to the county planning commission, i
one has been created, and approved by such commission before they shall Lrecorded It shall not be lawful to record any such plan or plat in the office <<
the county recorder unless the same shall bear thereon by endorsement n>
otherwise the approval of such commission. The approval of such plan or pla
by such commission shall not be deemed an acceptance of the proposed dedica
tion by the public. Such acceptance, if any, shall be given by action of tin
board of county commissioners. The owners and purchasers of such lots shal
be conclusively presumed to have notice of public plans, maps, and reports <•
such commission affecting such property within its jurisdiction.
From and after the time when a county planning commission has beei
appointed no land located within a subdivision as defined in this act shall \«
sold until and unless a subdivision plat shall have been approved by th>
planning commission and recorded in the office of the county recorder, excej*
that in subdivisions of less than ten lots, land may be sold by metes anbounds, without necessity of recording a plat if all of the following condition
are met: (a) The subdivision layout shall have been first approved in writm.
by the county planning commission, (b) the subdivision is not traversed by th«
mapped lines of a proposed street as shown on the official map or maps of th»
county, and does not require the dedication of any land for street or o t h n
public purposes, and (c) if the subdivision is located in a zoned area, each lot it
the subdivision meets the frontage, width and area requirements of the zonin
ordinance or has been granted a variance from such requirements by thboard of adjustment.
Whoever, being the owner or agent of the owner of any land located within
subdivision in a county where a county planning commission has been cr«
ated, transfers or sells any land in such subdivision before a plan or plat <
such subdivision has been approved by such planning commission and, excep
as set forth in the preceding paragraph, recorded in the office of the count
recorder, shall be guilty of a violation of this chapter for each lot or parcel transferred or sold; and the description of such lot or parcel by metes an
bounds in the instrument of transfer or other document used in the process <
selling or transferring shall not exempt the transaction from such penalties <••
from the remedies herein provided.
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17-27-22

COUNTIES

H i s t o r y : L. 19*1. c h . 2 3 . 5 2 1 : C. 1943.
19-24-21; U 1953. c h . 27. i 1: 19H3. c h . 37,
5 3.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1983 amendment substituted "\iolation of thi«* c h a p t e r " for
"misdemeanor" in the last p a r a g r a p h , and deleter! T h e tount> ma> enjoin such transfer or

sale or ajrreement by action for injunction
brought in any court of equity jurisdiction or
may recover the said penalty by civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction"' at the end
of the section.
M e a n i n g of "this a c t " . — See t h e note under the same catchhne following i 17-27-2.

ZONING AND P L A N N I N G
N O T E S TO DECISIONS
Injunctions.
Under this section, injunctive relief is available as an a l t e r n a t i v e to criminal prosecution;
a specific showing of irreparable injury is not

A m . J u r . 2d.
55 242 to 253

17-27-24.
17-27-22.

1911. c h . 23, 5 22; C. 1943.

M e a n i n g of "this act". — See the note under the same catchhne following i 17-27-2.

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S
C..J.S.
1(» 1 C J S Zomnn 5 10
Key N u m b e r s . — Zoning * j 14

17-27-23.

- H2 Am. J u r . 2d Zoning

C . J . S . - 101 C J S Zoning * 3i»u . •
K e y N u m b e r s . — Zoning *-» T*>1 it

Repealed.

Maximum regulation to govern.

Wherever the regulations made under authority of this act require a
greater width of size of yards, court, or other open spaces, or require a lower
height of buildings or smaller number of stories, or require a greater percentage of lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other higher standards than are
required in or under any other statute, the provisions of the regulations made
under authority of this act shall govern. Wherever the provisions of any other
statute require a greater width or size of yards, courts, or other open spaces, or
require a greater percentage of lot to be left unoccupied, or impose other
higher standards than are required by the regulations made under authority
of this act. the provisions of such statute shall govern.
History: I19-24-22.

required to obtain injunctive relief .n:.<
violation of a toning resolution Ct.ih <
v. Baxter 635 P 2d 61 ( U t a h H)H1»

COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S

N O T E S TO DECISIONS
No civil l i a b i l i t y for v i o l a t i o n .
violation thereof does not necessarily g i \ e rise
The purp<>M' <>f thi> -ectmn and 4 57-5-5 is to to civil liability Ellis v Hale. 13 Viah 2d 279.
impose a dut> r u n n i n g to the Mi\ereipn. and a
373 P 2 d 382 11962 >

17-J

Violation of chapter or ordinance as misdem e a n o r — Remedies of county and owners of real
estate.

Violation of Chapter 27, Title 17, or of any adopted county zoning, subdivision, or official map ordinance is punishable as a class C misdemeanor. The
board of county commissioners, the county attorney, or any owner of real
estate within the county in which such a violation occurs, may, in addition to
other remedies provided by law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement,
or any other appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or
remove the unlawful building, use, or act.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953. 17-27-23. e n a c t e d b y I~
1943. c h . 37. 5 4.
Repeals and Enactment*.
Laws 1983.
ch 37. 5 4 repealed former ft 17-27-23 <L
1941. ch 23. i 23. C 19C1. 19-24-23. I. 1973.

ch 197. i 2). relating to violations, and enacted present 4 17-27-23
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Sentencing for misdemeanors, 55 76 3 201. 76-3-204. 76 3-301.

482

R e p e a l s . — Section 17-27-24 lL 1941. ch.
2 3 . 5 24; C. 1943. 19-24-24). relating to the re-

17-27-25.

cording of wining regulations and m.t}>
repealed by I,aws 1977. ch 73, i 1

Enforcement — Acceptance of g r a n t s .

The board of county commissioners is empowered to enforce the />
regulations and restrictions which are adopted, and to accept grants of u,
and service for these purposes, and other purposes, in accordance with th<
from either private or public sources, state or federal.
History: I - 1941, c h . 2 3 , 5 25; C. 1943,
19-24-25.

M e a n i n g of " t h e act". — See the n.
der "meaning o f ' t h i s act'" following * 1

17-27-26. Conformity with plan — Exceptions.
None of the provisions of this act shall apply to any existing bin I
structure, plant or other equipment, except as provided in fc 17-27-1H
the adoption of a plan, all extensions, betterments or additions to builc
structures, plants or other equipment of a public utility shall be ma
conformity with such plan, unless, after public hearing, the public M
commission of the state or its successor commission, finds that the pi
relation to the extensions, betterments or additions is arbitrary and capr.
and orders that such extensions, betterments or additions be made
though they conflict with the adopted plan.
History: I~ 1941, c h . 2 3 . 9 28; C. 1943,
19-24-26; L. 1953, c h . 27, ft 1; 1983, c h . 2-14,
• I.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 1983 amendment deleted "as hereinbefore provided" after
"adoption of a plan" in the second sentence;
deleted "only" before "be m a d e " in t h e second
sentence, substituted finds t h a t t h e plan in
relation to t h e extensions, b e t t e r m e n t s or addi-

tions is arbitrary and capricious and or.:
the second sentence for if an>. ord.
such extensions, betterment* or addn
buildings, structures, plant or other e<n.
a r e reasonable and"; and made minor »
j n phraseology
M e a n i n g of " t h i s a c t " . - See the i.
< j,
d e r t h e 8flme c a t c h h n e foUowlnK

483

Addendum A. 15

OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS

Pt BL1C OKFICKRS

\ hen a public officer supervises a relative under Subsection (b):
n the public officer shall make a complete written disclosure of
- relationship to the chief administrative officer of the agency or
titution; and
m the public officer who exercises authority over a relative may
' evaluate the relatives job performance or recommend salary in.i**es for the relative.
pointee may accept or retain employment if he is paid from public
he is under the direct supervision of a relative, except as follows:
.e relative ua> appointed or employed before the public officer
• d his position, if the relative's appointment did not violate the
>ns of this chapter in effect at the time of his appointment;
hi' appointee wa> or is eligible or qualified to be employed by a
nent or agency of the state or a political subdivision of the state as
it of his compliance with civil service laws or regulations, or merit
laws or regulations;
Mr appointee is the only person available, qualified, or eligible for

52-3-2.

52-4-1

Each day of violation a separate offense.

Each day any such person, father, mother, hushand, wife, son, daughter,
sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousins, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law, is
retained in office by any of said officials shall be regarded as a separate
offense.
Hintory: ! - 1931. c h . 13, ft 2; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943. 4 9 1 2 2 .

52-3-3.

Penalty.

Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Ilinlory: I - 1931. c h . 13. ft 3; U.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 4 9 - 1 2 3 ; !~ 1953. c h . 79, ft 2.

C r o s s R e f e r e n c e s . — Sentencing for misdem e a n o r s . tft 7b-3-201, 76-3-204. 76-3-301.

-ition;

he appointee i^ compensated from funds designated for vocational
he appointee is employed for a period of 12 weeks or less;
'<e appointee is a volunteer as defined by the employing entity; or
he chief administrative officer has determined that the appointee's
e is the only person available or qualified to supervise the appoin-

1931. ch 13,§ 1 ; K S . 1 9 3 3 & C
!. I„ 1953. c h . 79. ft 1; 1955, c h .
c h . 159. 5 1; 19H8. c h . 25. ft 1.
nt N o t e s .
The I9s7 amend\h\< a c t i o n
tnu ndment effective April 25.

thohe who may not be qualified to serve.
Ilackman v Bateman. I Utah 2d 153. 263 P.2d
5<il 119531

History: 1„ 1931. c h . 13. ft 4; U.S. 1933 A C.
1943. 49-12-4.

CHAPTER 4
OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS
Section
52 4-1
52 4 2
52-4-3
52-4-4

52-4 5
COl.l VThKAL R h r h R K N C K S
2d. — 63A Am .Jur 2d Public Ofrnplo\e«'s 5 101
»>7 C.J S Officer* and Public Km
Valldit>. construction

and effect

of -t.ite constitutional or statutory provision
regarding nepotism in the public service, 11
A I. H 4th 826
Key Number*. — Officers and Public Emploveea *-» 29

Exception in towns.

In towns, this chapter shall not apply to the employment of uncles, aunts,
nephews, nieces or cousins.

19SS. mih-tituted "an emplo\ee~ for "a new emplovev" in Subsection <lMa). added Subsection
«'JMIIMI», and redesignated former Subjections
<2nh><i> to (2»(bMvii as present Subsections
ciNbMui to (2Mb)(vn».

NO IKS TO DECISIONS
•n
*hich anti nepotism statute', are
neffiru ncv in public office hv offiC their r e l a t i v e - and appointing

52-3-4.

52-4-1.

Declaration of public policy
lVfimtion*
Meetingn open to the public - Exception*
O w e d m e e t i n g held upon vote of
memlx'rw — HUM n e w - Reasons
for meeting recorded
l*urpo*e* of cloned meeting* —
C h a n c e meeting* and s o u a l meet-

52-4 H
52-4-9

ings excluded — Disruption of
meetings
Public notice of meetings
Minutes of open meetings — Public
records — Recording of meetings
Suit to void final action - Limitation — Kxceptions
Enforcement of chapter — Suit to
compel compliance

Declaration of public policy.

In enacting this chapter, the legislature finds and declares that the state,
iLs agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the people's business. It is the intent of the law that their actions he taken openly and
that their dehlwrations he conducted openly.
History: U 1955. c h . 133. ft I; 1977. c h .
ISO. ft 1.
Cro»»-Reference*.
Cemeter> maintenance commissioner*. l>ojird meetings public.
ft 8 1-13
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52-1 6
52-4 7

County commissioners, board meetings public. * 17-5-8
County improvement district board of
trustees meetings. § 17-6-3 4.

221

52-4-2

O P E N A N D PUBLIC M E E T I N G S

PUBLIC O F F I C E R S

Judicial Count11 met*tings. Rules of J u d i c i a l
Administration. Rule 2-103
Liquor control commission m e e t i n g s to be
open. $ 32A-l-6<6'
Municipal governing bodies, m e e t i n g s subject to this chapter. * 10-3-601

S t a t e money m a n a g e m e n t council meetings.
§ 51-7-16.
S t a t e board of financial institution* subject
to this chapter, $ 7-1-203(3).

52-4-3.

52-4-f)

Meetings open to the public — Exceptions.

Every meeting is open to the public unless closed pursuant to Sections
52-4-4 and 52-4-5.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-3, e n a c t e d b y L.
1977, c h . 180, 5 3.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Violations, suit
void final action, § 52-4-8.

to

N O T E S T O DECISIONS
N O T E S TO DECISIONS
Applicahilit>
IMilHTationApplicability.
not applicable to t h e U t a h
This chapter
S t a t e Retiremer Board Ellis v. U t a h S t a t e
Retirement Bd . (57 P 2 d 882 ( U t a h Ct App
198X>
COLLATERAL
U t a h U w R e v i e w . — Common Cause v
Utah Public Service Commission — The Appli-

52-4-2.

Deliberations.
Public Service Commission's deliberations
are not required to be open to t h e public when
they are part of the "decision m a k i n g " or judicial phase of the commission's work. Common
Cause of Utah v. Utah Pub Serv. Comm'n. 598
P 2 d 1312 (19791

REFERENCES
cability of Open-Meeting l e g i s l a t i o n to QuasiJudicial Bodies. 1980 UUih L. Rev. 829.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, with a quorum
present, whether in person or by means of electronic equipment, for the
purpose of discussing or acting upon a matter over which the public body
has jurisdiction or advisory power. This chapter shall not apply to chance
meetings "Convening," as used in this subsection, means the calling of a
meeting of a public body by a person or persons authorized to do so for the
express purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which that
public body has jurisdiction.
(21 "Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or
legislative body of the state or its political subdivisions which consists of
two or more persons that expends, disburses, or is supported in whole or
in part by tax revenue and which is vested with the authority to make
decisions regarding the public's business. "Public body" does not include
any political party, group, or caucus nor any conference committee, rules
or sifting committee of the legislature.
(3) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the membership of a public
body, unless otherwise defined by applicable law, but a quorum does not
include a meeting of two elected officials by themselves when no action,
either formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which these elected
officials have jurisdiction.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953. 52-4-2. e n a c t e d b y I~
1977, c h . 180. $ 2; 1981, c h . 191. 5 1; 1987,
c h . 86. 5 1.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . - The 1987 amendment. eflecti\e March lb\ 1987. substituted
c h a p t e r ' for "act"' in the introductory lan-

guage; substituted "in person" for "corporal" in
Subsection (J), and in the second sentence of
Subsection (2> substituted "nor any conference
committee, rules or sifting committee" for "or
rules or sifting committees "
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Public Service Commission.
Public Service Commission meetings should
be open to public d u r i n g commission's "information o b t a i n i n g ' phase, but not d u r i n g "dccision m a k i n g " or judicial phase; any final and
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules.

regulations, contracts, or appointment* should
be announced or issued in a meeting open to
t h e public. Common Cause of Utah v. U t a h
p u |> Serv. Comm'n. 598 P 2d 1312 (Utah
1979).

52-4-4. Closed meeting held u p o n vote of members — Business — Reasons for meeting recorded.
A closed meeting may be held upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
members of the public body present at an open meeting for which notice is
given pursuant to Section 52-4-6; provided, a quorum is present. No closed
meeting is allowed except as to matters exempted under Section 52-4-5; provided, no ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or appointment
shall be approved at a closed meeting. The reason or reasons for holding a
closed meeting and the vote, either for or against the proposition to hold such
a meeting, cast by each member by name shall be entered on the minutes of
the meeting.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any meeting to be
closed to the public.
History': C. 1953, 52-4-4, e n a c t e d b y L.
1977, c h . 180. ft 4.
N O T E S TO D E C I S I O N S
Public Service C o m m i s s i o n .
Public Service Commission meetings should
be open to public d u r i n g commission's "information o b t a i n i n g " phase, but not d u r i n g "decision m a k i n g " or judicial phase; any final and
formal action on ordinances, resolutions, rules.

52-4-5.

regulations, contracts, or appointments should
be announced or issued in a meeting open t<»
t h e public. Common Cause of Utah v Utah
pu»>. Serv. Comm'n. 598 P 2d 1312 (Utah
1 *J79).

P u r p o s e s of closed meetings — Chance meetings
and social meetings excluded — Disruption of
meetings.

( D A closed meeting may be held pursuant to Section 52-4-4 for any of the
following purposes:
(a) discussion of the character, professional competence, or physical or
mental health of an individual;
(b) strategy sessions with respect to collective bargaining, litigation, or
purchase of real property;
223

52-4-6

(c) discussion regarding deployment of security personnel or devices;
and
(d) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of criminal misconduct.
(2> This chapter shall not apply to any chance meeting or a social meeting.
No chance meeting or social meeting shall be used to circumvent this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prohibit the removal of any person who willfully
disrupts a meeting to the extent that orderly conduct is seriously compromised.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-5. enacted by I>.
1977. ch. 180. 5 5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.I~R.
Construction and application of
exemptions, under 5 USCS § f>.r>'2b«c>. to open

52-4-6.

meeting requirement of Sunnhine Act, 82
A L R Fed 465.

Public notice of meetings.

(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that are scheduled in
advance over the course of a year shall give public notice at least once each
year of its annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. The public
notice shall specify the date, time, and place of such meetings.
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Subsection (1) of this section,
each public body shall give not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda,
date, time and place of each of its meetings.
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by:
(a) posting written notice at the principal office of the public body, or if
no such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held; and
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of general circulation
within the geographic jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local media
correspondent.
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is necessary for a public
body to hold an emergency meeting to consider matters of an emergency or
urgent nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) may be disregarded and the best notice practicable given. No such emergency meeting of a
public body shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify all of its
members and a majority votes in the affirmative to hold the meeting.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-6, enacted by I~
1977. ch. 180, 5 6; 1978. ch. 17. 5 1.

52-4-7.

OPEN AND PUBLIC MELTINGS

PUBLIC OFFICERS

Cross-References. — Closed meeting held
upon vote at open meeting. 8 52-4-4.
Violations, suit to void final action. I 52-4-8.

Minutes of open meetings — Public records — Recording of meetings.

(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or decided, a
record, by individual member, of votes taken;
(d) the names of all citizens who appeared and the substance in bn
their testimony;
(e) any other information that any member requests be entered in
minutes.
(2) Written minutes shall be kept of all closed meetings. Such minutes .include:
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the names of members present and absent;
(c) the names of all others present except where such disclosure w.
infringe on the confidence necessary to fulfill the original purpos*
closing the meeting.
(3) The minutes are public records and shall be available within a rea
able time after the meeting.
(4) All or any part of an open meeting may be recorded by any perso.
attendance; provided, the recording does not interfere with the conduct ot
meeting.
History: C. 1953, 52-4-7, ertneted by L.
1977. ch. 180. I 7; 1978. ch. 17, 5 2.

52-4-8.

Suit to void final action — Limitation — Exc<
tions.

Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 and 52-4-6 is void
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be <
menced within 90 days after the action except that with respect to any t
action concerning the issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of indel
ness suit shall be commenced within 30 days after the action.
History: C. 1953. 52-4-8. enacted by L.
1977, ch. 180, i 8; 1978. ch. 17. ft 3.

52-4-9.

Enforcement of chapter — Suit to compel conij
ance.

(1) The attorney general and county attorneys of the state shall enforce
chapter.
(2) A person denied any right under this chapter may commence suit
court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with or enjoin violat
of this chapter or to determine its applicability to discussions or decisions
public body. The court may award reasonable attorney fees and court COM
a successful plaintiff.
History: C. 1953. 52-4-9. enacted by I„
1977, ch. 180. i 9.

(1) Written minutes shall be kept of all open meetings. Such minutes shall
include:
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(hi the names of members present and absent;
224
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim. Recoupment, and Setoff §5 4, 9, 13, 15,
35, 56, 57, 68. 73, 87, 101, 117, 139, 149. 151,
155, 156; 20 Am Jur. 2d Courts § 169, 59 Am.
Jur. 2d Parties 5 188 et seq.; 61A Am. Jur. 2d
Pleading 5§ 182 to 186.
C.J.S. — 21 CJS. Courts J 66; 50 CJ.S.
Judgments 5 684; 67A CJ.S Parties $5 88 to
110; 71 C.J S Pleading §5 167 to 176; 80 CJ.S.
Setoff and Counterclaim JS 1 et seq., 13, 27,
36, 54.
A.L.R. — Bank's right to apply or set off
deposit against debt of depositor not due at
time of his death. 7 A L.R3d 908.
Proceeding for summary judgment as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8
A L R 3d 1361
Presentation of claim to executor or adminis*
trator as prerequisite of its availability as
counterclaim or setoff. 36 A L R 3d 693.
Right of party-litigant to defend or counter-

claim on ground that opposing party or hi* attomey is engaged in unauthorized practice of
law, 7 A.LR.4th 1146.
Necessity and permiaaibility of ralaing daim
for abuae of process by reply or counterclaim in
aame proceeding in which abuae occurred —
atat* esses, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115.
Who ii an "opposing party" against whom a
counterclaim can be filed under Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 13(a) or (b), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 815.
Joinder of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or
13(b) of Federal Rulea of Civil Procedure with
jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b) aa
waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388.
Effect of filing as separate federal action
claim that would be compulsory counterclaim
in pending federal action, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 240.
Key Numbers. — Courts «• 189(6'/i); Judgment«- 622(2); Parties •- 49 to 56; Pleading • 145, 149; Set-off and Counterclaim •- 1 et seq.,
3, 29(1), 40, 42J/j, 48 et seq., 59.

Rule 14. Third-party practice.
(a) When d e f e n d a n t m a y bring in third party. At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a
summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against
him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he
files the third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his
original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all
parties to the action. The person served with the summons and third-party
complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other
third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may
assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to
the plaintiffs claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff. The
plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim
against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
Bhall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the thirdparty defendant.
(b) When plaintiff m a y b r i n g in third party. When a counterclaim is
asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is Bimilar to
Rule 14(a) and (b), F R C P .
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
ii * • • J ^A
Appellate jurisdiction.
Jf^.
_/ , , , , ,
Third party by defendant
P
J
TT »r0UI? *' »• .
II
i
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim.
p-j.
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Appellate jurisdiction.
The final judgment rule, RCiv.P. 54(b), ap..
,
,, • , ,
* ,
\
plies when the trial court orders a separate
i •
i •
i•
t:n a i r.i.
' ° * t n e c'a»m, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, and failure to have the case
_,:r. J c i i. .«. . i
_. i : i
certified as final by the trial court, leaving issues and parties before that court, will deprive

the appellate court of jurisdiction over an appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298
(Utah 1991).
Third party by defendant
~Grounds.
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the defendant in the Initial action does so not on the
^ ° u n d . £ a t . * !P lalm ^ r ™ ] " . ^ e x l l U
against the thir^party defendant, but on the
ground that the third-party defendant ^nay be
liable" to the defendant in the principal action.
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d
1344 (Utah 1984).

Untimely motion to allow counterclaim,
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying motions to allow a counterclaim and to
^ m « j " **** P*? v defendants which wert
filed 13 months after an answer to the complaint was filed and two weeks before the
^h^uled ^ j d a U ) | w h ere reasons for the imt i m e l y m o t i o n w e r e i n a d e q U a U and where the
rtie8
failed ^ demorvfltraU ^
t h e ^MTVI
denial of the motions resulted in prejudice,
^
v Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App
iggV)
Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc.,
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
Q 188 et seq.
CJ.S. — 67 CJ.S. Parties 55 72 to 84.
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution

or indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.
Key Numbers. — Parties *=• 49 to 56.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once aa a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days afler service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) A m e n d m e n t s to conform to t h e e v i d e n c e . When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in a\\ respects a& if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable t h a t the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 15, F R C P .
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Uile 25. Substitution of parties.
a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution
may be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the
deceased party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on
the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless the
motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days after the death
is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the
death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or
more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be
enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be suggested
upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or against the
surviving parties.
b) I n c o m p e t e n c y . If a party becomes incompetent, the court upon motion
rved as provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule may allow the action to be
ntinued by or against his representative.
c) Transfer of interest In case of any transfer of interest, the action may
continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion
tcts the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the
lion or joined with the original party. Service of the motion shall be made as
•vided in Subdivision (a) of this rule.
d) P u b l i c officers; death or separation from office. When a public
icer is a party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or other-e ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or
iinst his successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it is
; isfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so contin:ig and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant to this rule may be made
ien it is shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an officer
>pts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predesor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless
pressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the applica•n therefor and accorded an opportunity to object.
ompUer's Notes. — This rule is subetan!y similar to Rule 25, F R C P .
« rose-References. — Amended and supple-lal pleadingB, U.R.C.P. 15.
laima for relief. U.R.C.P. 8*a).
roas demands not affected by death,
••: C.P. 13(i).
^•positions, use following substitution of
lies, U.R.CP 32(a).
udgment against party dying afler verdict
iedsion, payment of, 9 78-22-1.1.

Judgment may be rendered after death of
party, U.R.C.P. 58A(e).
Limitation of actions, effect of death, 69 7812-37, 78-12-38
Parties plaintiff and defendant; capacity,
U.R.C.P. 17.
Permissive joinder of parties, U.R.C.P. 20.
Substitution of parties on appeal, Rule 38,
Utah R. App. P.
Time, U.R.C.P. 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ah.
\etion against estate.
. ailure to move to substitute.
nsfer of interest,
nveyance by defendant.
nth.
(Uon against estate.
• here widow sought to continue separate
nenance action against deceased hua-

band's estate, existence of her claim was
ground for appointment of Utah representative, and she waa not entitled to have disinterested person substituted as defendant even
though husband died in smother state and left
no property in Utah and his executrix in other
state refused to appear. Allred v. Allred, 12
Utah 2d 325, 366 P 2d 478 (1961).
—Failure to move to substitute.
Where a defendant died and his death was
immediately noted upon the court record, but
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plaintiff never moved for • substitution of parties nor aaked for an enlargement of the 90-day
period within which to seek substitution, it
was not error for the trial court to dismiss the
complaint. Connelly v. Ratfyen. 647 P.2d 1336
(Utah 1976).
Transfer of interest.
—Conveyance by defendant
In quiet title action court did not lose juris-

Rule 26

diction when defendant conveyed during pendency of action; Subdivision (c) continues litigation with same litigants to determinative
conclusion, to avoid stalemate by conveyance
pendente lite, resulting in series of endless
suits. Briggs v. Hess. 122 Utah 559. 252 P 2d
538 (1963).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties
}J 225 et seq., 231 to 233.
C.J.8. — 67 C.J.S. Parties 5 58 et aeq.
A.L.R. — Enforceability of warrant of attorney to confess judgment against assignee,
guarantor, or other party obligating himself
for performance of primary contract, 5
A L.R 3d 426.
Divorce or annulment of marriage, power of
incompetent spouse's guardian, committee, or
next friend to sue for granting or vacation of,
or to make a compromise or settlement in such
suit. 6 A LR3d 681.
Bank's right to apply or set off deposit
against debt of depositor not due at time of his
death, 7 A.LR.3d 908.
Validity and effect of agreement that debt or
legal obligation contemporaneously or subsequently Incurred shall be canceled by death of
creditor or obligee, 11 A.L.R.3d 1427.
Applicability, as affected by change in parties, of statute permitting commencement of
new action within specified time after failure
of prior action not on merits, 13 A.L.R.3d 848.

Cause of death, official death certificate as
evidence of in civil or criminal action, 21
A.L.RSd 418.
Attorney's death prior to final adjudication
or settlement of case as affecting compensation
under contingent fee contract, 33 A.L.R.3d
1375.
Validity, in contract for installment sale of
consumer goods, or commercial paper given in
connection therewith, of provision waiving, as
against assignee, defenses good against seller,
39 A.L.R.3d 518.
Conservator or guardian for an incompetent,
priority and preference in appointment of, 65
A.L.R.3d 991.
Defamation action as surviving plaintiff's
death, under statute not specifically covering
action, 42 A.L.R.4th 272.
Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party,
filed under Rule 25(a)(1) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of
party afler death, 105 A.LR. Fed. 816.
Key Numbers. — Parties «=• 59.

PART V.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
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(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).
(2) I n s u r a n c e a g r e e m e n t s . A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any person
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to batisfy the judgment. Information concerning
the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissible in
evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement.
(3) Trial p r e p a r a t i o n : Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b><4> of this rule, a party may obtain discovery' of documents and
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impn sMons, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon
request a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a
statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court
order The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in -elation to the motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is
a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(4) Trial p r e p a r a t i o n : E x p e r t s . Discovery of facta known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of Subdivision (bnl) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of
litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
<A> (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other
party to identify each person whom the other party expects to
call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on
uhich the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
(n) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by
other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such
provisions, pursuant to Subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b)
or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
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impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result,
(i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery
pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this
rule; and
(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision
(b)(4KA)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect
to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the
court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
(c) P r o t e c t i v e o r d e r s . Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other
than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons
designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the
court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(d) S e q u e n c e a n d timing of discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not
operate to delay any other party's discovery.
(e) S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n of r e s p o n s e s . A party who has responded to a request for discovery Vith a response that was complete when made is under no
duty to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired,
except as follows:
( D A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the
Bubject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response
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though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment.
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new
requests for supplementation of prior responses.
(0 Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an action,
the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a
conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by
the attorney for any party if the motion includes:
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) a proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on
the matters set forth in the motion. Each party and his attorney are
under a duty to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters
set forth in the motion shall be served not later than ten days after
service of the motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and
-chedule for discovery, setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary
lor the proper management of discovery in the action. An order may be altered
>r amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a discovery conference
:o prompt convening of the conference, the court may combine the discovery
.onference with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 16.
tg) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every
request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state
ins address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification
:hat he has read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of his
Knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is: (1)
* onsistent with these ruled and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
viiscovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, or objection
is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omislon is called to the attention of the party making the request, response, or
bjection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to
it until it is signed.
If a certification in made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certifica;ion, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or
;>oth, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount
>f the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an
iction or proceeding in another state may take the deposition of any person
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within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and
limitationfl as if such action or proceeding were pending in this state, provided
that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such deposition
shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in .vhich the person
whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further
that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition which by the
rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court
in the county where the deposition is being taken.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — Thia rule corresponds
to Rule 26, F R C P .
Croaa-Rcfcrencca. — Admissibility of evidence, 8 78-21-3; U.RC.P. 43(a).
Continuance to permit discovery, U.RC.P.
68(f).

Depositions upon oral examination, U.R C.P.
30(c).
Depositions, use in court proceedings,
U.RC.P. 32.
Depositions, when taken, U.R C P. 30(a).
Discovery procedures, Rule 4-502, Rules of
Judicial Administration.
Exclusion of deposition from evidence,
U.RC.P. 32(b).
NOTES TO
Applicability of rale.
Appellate review.
—Denial of discovery request.
Privilege against self-incrimination.
Protective order.
—Trade secrete.
—Waiver
Purpose of rule.
Scope of discovery.
—In general.
Relevance.
—Insurance agreements.
—Official information privilege
—Trial preparation.
Adjuster's file.
Discovery from state
Eminent domain
Otherwise discoverable records
Subjective matters
Testimony of witness
Cited.
Applicability of rule.
The taking of depositions pursuant to the
Utah Rulea of Civil Procedure is applicable in
an action to remove a public official from office
for malfeasance pursuant to Title 77, Chapter
6. State v. Geurta, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P 2d 12
(1961).
Appellate review.
—Denial of discovery request
When denial of a discovery request is determined on review to have been in error, the burden of demonstrating that the erroneous denial
was not prejudicial is upon the party resisting
discovery. Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, granted, 892 P.2d
13 (Utah 1995).
Privilege against self-incrimination.
Privilege against self-incrimination may be

Expert and other opinion testimony, U.R E
701 to 706.
Fee for filing notice «-f deposition concerning
action in another stats, 5 21-1-5.
Liability insurance, admissibility of, U.R.E
411.
Motions, evidence on, by depositions,
U.RC.P. 43(b).
Privileges, 55 78-24-8, 78-24-9; U.R.E 501 et
seq.
Summary judgment, discovery supporting or
opposing motion for, U.R C.P. 56(e).
Terminate or limit examination, motion to,
URC.P. 30(d).
DECISIONS
asserted in civil discover.' proceedings to refuse to answer interrogatories, questions posed
in depositions, demands for production of documents, and requests for admissions; however,
to sustain an assertion of the privilege, a party
muBt show that the response sought to be compelled might be incriminating. First Fed. Sav.
&. Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257
(Utah 1984)
Protective order.
—Trade secret*.
Materials that are the subject of a protective
order under Subdivision (c)(7) are not automatically privileged for purposes of Exemption 4 of
the federal Freedom of Information Act because the determination of whether documents
contain trade secrets under Exemption 4 is to
be made solely by applying the express exemption for trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information found in the exemption iUelf. Anderson v. Department of
Health & Human Servs , 907 F.2d 936 (10th
Cir. 1990).
—Waiver.
Inaction and delay in filing a motion for protection with respect to documents alleged to be
work product waives whatever right a defendant may have been able to assert. Moreover, a
defendant's failure to demonstrate any diligence whatsoever in asserting the privilege is
itnelf a waiver. Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P 2d 164
(Utah 1990).
Purpose of rule.
The purposes of discovery rules are to make
discovery as simple and efficient as possible by
eliminating any unnecessary technicalities,
and to remove elements of surprise or trickery
so that the parties and the court can determine
the facts and resolve the issues as directly,
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late on morning trial was commenced because
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme
Court a w n t of prohibition to prevent the hold
m g of the trial on that day due to absence of
defense witnesses the t n a l court erred in
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiffs evi
dence notwithstanding any ill advised irritating or contemptuous conduct from defense
counsel during the action since the law prefers
that a case be tried on its merits and the par
ties litigant should not be made to suffer for
the misconduct of their counsel McKean v
Mountain View Mem Estates Inc 17 Utah 2d
323 411 P 2 d 129 (1966)
—Default entry n e c e s s a r y
No default judgment may be entered under
Subdivision ib (2) unless default has prevt
ously been entered The entry of default is an
essential predicate to any default judgment P
& B Land Inc v Klungervik 751 P 2d 274
(Utah Ct App 1988)
—Failure to follow rule
Rule 54(c)(2) and this rule prescribe the pro
cedure to be followed b\ trial courts in entering
judgments against defaulting parties and
courts are not at hbert> to deviate from those
rules just because one party is in default and is
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the
case Russell v Martell 681 P 2d 1193 (Utah
1984*
Judgment against defaulting part> must be
reversed where plaintiffs claims for damages
were not for surra certain and a hearing was
not conducted by the trial court to ascertain
the amount of damages to wh ch tht plaintiffs
were entitled Russell v Martell 681 P 2d
1193 (Utah 1984)
The entrv of a default judgment b> a court
with jurisdiction o\er the parties and the subject matter where there is no default in law or
in fact is improper and voidable P & B Land
Inc v Klungervik 751 P 2d 274 (Ltah Ct
App 1988)
—Hearing on merits
No one has an inalienable or constitutional
right to a judgment by default without a hear
ing on the merits The courts in the interest of
justice and fair play fa\or where possible a
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on
the merits of every case Heathman v rabian
14 Utah 2d 60 377 P 2d 189 (1962)
—Punita\e damages
Lower courts award of punitive damages
without proof and upon default judgment was
in and of itself justification for vacating judg
ment Security Adjustment Bureau Inc v
West, 20 Ltah 2d 292 437 P 2d 214 (1968)
Notice
This rule provides that a party in default
need not be given rotice o( the entry of default
judgment Central Bank &. Trust C o v Jensen
656 P 2 d 1009 ( l t a h 1982)
Setting aside default
An entry of default may be set aside under
this rule for good cauBe shown by the court
once a judgment b> default has been entered
however it may be set aside only in accordance
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with Rule 60(b) Calder Bros Co • Anderson,
652 P 2d 922 (Utah 1982)
Once a default judgment has been entered, it
can only be set aside In accordance with Rule
60(b) Arnica Mut Ins Co v SchetUcr, 768
P 2d 960 (Utah C t App 1989)
—Collateral attack.
Where affidavit for publication of summons
contained some evidence upon which the order
for publication of summons could reasonably
be based, a default judgment against the defendant could not be attacked collatarally, even if
the evidence was Insufficient to persuade the
judge or clerk of the neceeaary facta Bowen v
Olson 122 Utah 66, 246 P 2d 602 (1952)
—Direct attack
An action brought to vacate a default judg*
ment on ground that service of summons by
publication was obtained by fraud is a direct
and not a collateral attack Bowen v Olson,
122 Utah 66 246 P 2d 602 (1952)
—Discretion of c o u r t
A tnal court is endowed with considerable
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a
motion to set a default judgment aside Board
of Educ v Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P 2d 806
(1963)
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on throe occasions before three different judges and his motions were denied in the first two proceedings,
the third judge was barred by the law of the
case from overruling the previous orders
Maacaro v Davis 741 P 2d 938 (Utah 1967)
—Grounds
Excusable n e g l e c t
A default certificate may be set aside upon
grounds of excusable neglect Heathman v
Fabian 14 Utah 2d 60 377 P 2d 189 (1962)
While reliance on an attorney's assurances
that o n e s rights are being protected could, in
the appropriate circumstances be seen as ex
cusable neglect t n a l court properly refused to
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to
establish that she was so represented Miller v
Brocksmith 825 P 2d 690 (Utah Ct App
1992)
—Judicial attitude
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by
defaulting party courts generally tend to favor
granting relief from a default judgment unless
to do so would result in substantia! prejudice or
injustice to the adverse party Westinghouse
Elec Supply Co v Paul W Larsen Contractor,
544 P 2d 876 (Utah 1975)
—Movant's duty
Party who seeks to have a default judgment
set aside must proffer some defense of at least
sufficient ostensible m e n t to justify a trial on
that issue Downey State Bank v Major
Blakeney Corp 545 P 2d 507 (Utah 1976)
—Setting aside p r o p e r
V»here plaintiff served defendant with a
summons and left a copy with the defendant
which was not the same as the original the
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion
was created so that a motion to set aside the
default judgment should hsve been granted
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent
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with our declared policy that in case of uncer
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trie! on the merits Locke \ Peterson 3
Utah 2d 415 285 P 2d 1111 (1955)
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
ware properly eet aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued Fibreboard
Paper Prods Corp v Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P 2 d 1005 (1970)
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
data, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion daye between time objection was filed
and trial date objection was never heard re

Rule

56

fusal to set aside default judgment e n u r e d
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v Ham
mon 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977)
T i m e for a p p e a l
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such judg
ment, rather than from the date of judgment
Buckner v Main Realty & Ins Co 4 Utah 2d
124 288 P 2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d))
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965)
J P W E n t e r s , Inc v Naef 604 P 2d 486
(Utah 1979) KaU v Pierce 732 P 2d 92 (Utah
1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
B r l g h a m Y o u n g U w R e v i e w — Reason
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah Gra
ham v Sawaya, 1981 B Y U L Rev 937
A m J u r 2d — 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments
5 265 et seq
CJA
— 4 9 C . J S Judgments 55 187 to 218
A L R . — Necessity of takina proof aa to ha
bility against defsulting defendant 8 A L R 3d
1070
Appealability of order setting aside or refusing to set aside default judgment 8 A L R 3d
1272
Defaulting defendants right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of dam
ages, 15 A L R 3d 586

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorne> s
mistake as to time or place of appearance
tnal or filing of necessary papers 21 A L R 3d
1255
Failure to give notice of application for de
fault judgment where notice is required only
by custom 28 A L R 3d 1383
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference 55 A L R 3d 303
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 55 A L R Fed 190
Key N u m b e r s — Judgment ** 92 to 134

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For c l a i m a n t A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
croaa claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment m his favor upon all or any
part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully a d j u d i c a t e d on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub
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stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedingB in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken OT discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler'* Notes. — This rale is similar to
Rule 56. F R C P .

CrossRcferences. — Contempt generally,
99 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Affidavit.
—Contents.
-Corporation
—Experts
—Inconsistency with deposition
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings
—Objection
—Sufficiency
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defensea.
-Verified pleading.
-Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facta.
—Who may make.
•\ffirmative defense
\nswers to interrogatories.
\ppeal.
-Adversely affected party
-Standard of review.
Utorney's fees
\vailabihty of motion
'ompliance with rule.
* ross-motions
Damages.

Discovery.
Disputed facta.
Evidence.
—Facta considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.
Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismias.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Findings by court.
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showing there is a genuine issue for trial; affi—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
davits must include not only the expert's opin—Fraud or duress.
ion, but also the specific facta that logically
—Guardianship
support the expert's conclusion. Butterfield v.
—Mortgage note.
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992).
—Negligenoe.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
Party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit
-Note.
that contradicts his deposition to create an is—Recovery for goods and services.
sue of fact on a motion for summary judgment
—Stock ownership.
unless there is some substantial likelihood
—Wrongful possession.
that the deposition testimony was in error or
Summary judgment proper.
the party-deponent is able to state in his affi—Contract action.
davit an adequate explanation for the contra—Contract terms.
dictory answer in his deposition. Webster v.
-Deceit.
Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983); Gaw v. State.
—Jurisdiction.
798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
—Negligence.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
—Res ipsa loquitur.
Time for motion.
Where a defendants motion for summary
Written statement of grounds.
judgment is based solely on his pleadings and
is not made and supported by affidavits, as proCited.
vided in Subdivision (c), plaintiff, pursuant to
Affidavit
Subdivision (e), may rest on the allegations in
—Contents.
Specific facta are required to show whether his pleadingB. Parrish v. Layton City Corp.,
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Out- 542 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975).
Fact that party opposed to the motion for
door Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776
summary judgment fails to submit documents
(Utah 1984).
When a motion for summary judgment is in opposition does not preclude the denial of
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad- the motion; where the party opposed submits
verse party must contain specific evidentiary no documents in opposition, the moving party
facta showing that there is a genuine issue for may be granted summary judgment only if aptrial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 propriate, that ia, he is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585
(Utah 1986).
Affidavits submitted by plaintiff that con- (Utah 1982).
When a party opposes a properly supported
tained opinion, legal conclusions, and facta not
supported by adequate foundstion but portions motion for summary judgment and fails to file
of which complied with Subdivision (e), be- any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary
cause the objectionable statements did nothing materials allowed by Subdivision (e), the trial
more than supplement the arguments made in court may properly conclude that there are no
plaintiffs memorandum, did not prejudice de- genuine issues of fact unless the face of the
fendants. Brosdwster v. Old Republic Sur., 854 movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the
existence of such an issue. Franklin Fin. v.
P.2d 527 (Utah 1993).
New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah
—Corporation.
1983); Cowen 8c Co. v. Atlaa Stock Tranaf. Co.,
Where an affidavit is made by an officer of a
corporation, it ia generally considered to be the 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State
Farm
Fire & Caa. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah
affidavit of the corporation itself. However, the
1987).
personal knowledge of an agent of the corporaSummary judgment need not be affirmed
tion who is not a corporate officer regarding
merely because party opposing summary judgthe facts to which he has sworn will generally ment did not file affidavits in order to avoid
not be presumed, and therefore, the specific judgment against him Mountain States Tel. St
"means and sources" of his information should Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered,
be shown. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Asa'n v. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).
Watts, 737 P 2d 154 (Utah 1987).
When read in light of Subdivision (b), it is
—Experts.
clear that the Subdivision (e) requirement that
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 allows the expert a party opposing the summary judgment moto state his opinion concerning the ultimate tion file counter-affidavits applies only when
issue in the case, and an expert affidavit must the moving party haa elected to and has filed
also contain a sufficient factual basis for the affidavits in support of the motion. If the movopinion proffered. Thus, the affidavit is suffi- ing party chooses not to or simply fails to file
cient if it articulates the facts upon which the affidavits, Subdivision (e) is inapplicable. Gadd
opinion was based and if the facts were of the v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1984).
Hype usually relied upon by experta in the
When a motion for summary judgment is
field." Oaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. filed and supported by an affidavit, the party
App. 1990).
opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to
Because the sole purpose underlying Utah R. respond with affidavits or other materials alEvid. 705 ia to obviate the need to use hypo- lowed by Subdivision (e). D & L Supply v.
thetical questions to elicit expert opinion, the Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Thayne v.
rule's drafters did not intend to exempt expert
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah
from the requirement in Subdivision (e) of this 1994).
rule that affidavits set forth specific facta

